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PUBLIC CORRUPTION:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION
CONVENTIONS AND UNITED STATES LAV
Peter J. Henning*
I. INTRODUCTION
Corrupt acts by public officials are not countenanced in any political
regime, at least not publicly, if that government wishes to retain its authority to
enforce the law. Yet, what exactly is "corruption"? There is no single definition
of corruption,' and the term has described everything from blatant acts of bribery
to the use of political power to advance one party or faction's agenda. While
every nation has criminal proscriptions on bribing government officials,2 bribery
is only one manifestation of public corruption. The criminal law is not the only
means to inhibit corruption, and many nations have adopted ethical guidelines for
public administration and regulations on campaign finance to limit the opportunity
to misuse, or improperly influence, public authority.
Individual officials can abuse their authority in an almost limitless
number of ways. For example, the expansion of the internet and electronic mail
means that a governmental employee can easily conduct personal business during
work hours, often with little threat of being detected or disciplined. Is this use of
government resources a corrupt act, and, if so, should the law treat it as a criminal
violation? While there is pressure to expand the criminal law to address public
corruption, others criticize the adoption of increasingly intricate guidelines on
government employee conduct because they detract from the effort to enhance
ethical standards.3 Legislators must strike a delicate balance between drafting
'Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. ©Peter . Henning. I
appreciate the constructive comments and suggestions of Professors Ellen Podgor, Chris
Blakesley, Bill Burnham, and Gennady Danilenko, and the excellent research assistance of

Brittany Schultz, Esq.. My friend and colleague, Edward Wise, inspired me to think about
this topic from a comparative point of view, and I miss his counsel and encouragement.
1. See, e.g., John G. Peters & Susan Welch, Political Corruptionin America: A
Searchfor Definitions and a Theory, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 974, 976 (1978).
2.

See FRITZ HEI1ANN, SHOULD FOREIGN BRIBERY BE A CRIME? 7 (1994)

("There is no country in the world where bribery is either legally or morally acceptable.");
David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption:A PrincipledApproach; 7he C2
Principles(Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J 593, 595 (2000) ("Scholars
studying the corruption phenomenon have noted a unique paradox: corruption is universally
disapproved yet universally prevalent."); Claire Moore Dickerson, PoliticalCorruption:
Free-Flowing Opportunism, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 393, 395 (1999) ("scholars have
asserted that every country has laws against bribery of its ovM officials").
3. See FRANK ANECHIARICO & JAMES B. JACOBS, THE PURSUIT OF ABSOLUTE
INTEGRITY: HOW CORRUPTION CONTROL MAKES GOVERNMENT INEFFECTIVE xii
(1996) ("It should not be assumed, as it often has been, that all corruption controls further
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effective laws to prohibit corruption and adopting guidelines which are little more
than an exercise in micromanagement that makes following the rules an end in
itself rather than a means to serve the public interest.4
At a fundamental level, the term "corruption" does not denote any
particular transgression, and need not even be conduct that would constitute a
crime. Despite the problems with identifying and rooting out official corruption,
there is unanimous agreement that it is wrongful and cannot be tolerated in
civilized society.5 The harm wrought by corrupt public officials on both their own
nation and the global economy is significant. Indeed, opposing corruption is a
or even coincide with government efficiency and effectiveness, or that such measures
actually reduce corruption."); Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in
Government?: An Answer From Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 62 (1996)

("Adding more ethics regulation actually may be counterproductive.

It distracts both

government officials and the public from the more general goal of protecting the public
trust.").
4. See ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note 3, at xv ("The irony of corruption
control is that the more anticorruption machinery we create, the more we create
bureaucratic pathology and red tape."); ABA Comm. on Gov't Standards, Keeping Faith:
Government Ethics & Government Ethics Regulation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 290 (1993)
("The more zealous the effort to identify and legislate against wrongful conduct, the more
elusive the goal of achieving ethical behavior has become. Each reform has added another
layer of regulation. The result is a complex and formidable rule structure, whose rationale
is increasingly obscure and whose operation is increasingly arcane.").
5. See Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millenium, 31 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L BUS. 47, 49 (1999) ("While the commentators naturally have posed a
variety of policy solutions to the problem, virtually all now agree that transnational bribery
is a major economic and ethical concern."); Andrea D. Bontrager Unzicker, Note, Fron
Corruption to Cooperation: Globalization Brings a Multilateral Agreement Against
Foreign Bribery, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 655, 659 (2000) ("Bribery is
universally shameful, but despite the host of negative effects tied to international corruption
and the fact that virtually every country in the world has laws against domestic bribery,
many nations have been unwilling, until recently, to address the problem.").
Rejection of corruption does not mean that all agree that international efforts to
combat corruption are acceptable. Professor Salbu has criticized efforts to define certain
practices as corrupt as a form of cultural imperialism. See Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial
Restriction of Bribery: A PrematureEvocation of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE
J. INT'L L. 223 (1999), although others argue that anti-corruption laws do not undermine
cultural norms; Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational
Intrusion, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 627, 645 (2000) ("The characterization of anti-bribery
laws as dangerously intrusive errs in two important ways."); Bill Shaw, The Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct and Progeny: Morally Unassailable,33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 689,
705-06 (2000) ("This criminalization does not constitute moral imperialism. Indeed, to
allow such conduct is morally questionable.").
6. See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A
STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1978) [hereinafter ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION);
Beverly Earle, Bribery and Corruption in Eastern Europe the Baltic States, and the
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clich6, akin to supporting "mom and apple pie."7 Recently, many nations have
worked at the international level to enhance the fight against public corruption
through the adoption of multilateral agreements requiring the signatory countries
to adopt tougher domestic criminal laws to punish abuses of public authority.
In 1996, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the InterAmerican Convention Against Corruption (LACAC), whose purpose is "[t]o
promote and strengthen the development by each of the States Parties of the
mechanisms needed to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption .... "s
The United States ratified the IACAC on September 15, 2000, joining 20 other
OAS nations that ratified the Convention. In 1997, the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions
(OECD Convention) to address a problem that "raises serious moral and political
concerns, undermines good governance and economic development, and distorts
international competitive conditions."' 10 There are two European initiatives to
address the problem of public corruption. In 1997, the European Union
promulgated the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption in order to improve
judicial cooperation in criminal matters among the member states." Building on
that Convention, the Council of Europe adopted a much broader approach in the
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Council Convention) in 1999 that calls
on all of the member states of the European Union to implement "a common
criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against corruption .... ."12
Commonwealth of Independent States: What Is To Be Done?,33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 483,
484-85 (2000) ("Bribery and corruption threaten the ability of [Eastern European] countries

to complete their work toward privitazation by distorting the development process and

discouraging private investment.").
7. See David Kennedy, The InternationalAnti-Corrption Campaign, 14 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 455,

455 (1999) ("Hovever difficult it might be to define 'corruption,' in polite

society one must be opposed to it.").
8. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, March 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724,
728, art. II, § I [hereinafter ACAC].
9. 146 CONG. REC. S7809 (2000). For a list of OAS members that have adopted
the IACAC, see http:www.oas.org.
10. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 LL.M. I, art. I, T 5 [hereinafter OECD
Convention]. The United States signed the Convention and adopted implementing
legislation entitled the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998). The Convention entered into force on February 15,
1999. See OECD Home Page http'/wvv.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption.
11. Council ActNo. 97/C 195/01, 1997 O.J. 195, 2-11.
12. Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, January 27, 1999, Preamble, ETS No.
173 [hereinafter Council Convention]. In 1998, the Council created the Group of States
Against Corruption, knovn by the acronym GRECO, to coordinate the fight against
corruption. Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe, Multidisciplinary Group on
Corruption: Draft Agreement Establishing the Group of States Against Corruption (Apr. 2,
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While easily assailed, corruption is not a term susceptible to facile
definition.' 3 The Conventions rely on the traditional offense of bribery as the
paradigm of corruption, defining the crime as the offer of any "advantage" in
connection with the discharge of public duties. They then address obliquely a few
broader instances of corruption, such as influence-peddling or the misuse of office
for personal gain. The IACAC has the broadest provision, defining corruption to
include "[a]ny act or omission in the discharge of his duties by a government
official... for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third
person."' 14 Although the Conventions seek to promote uniformity, they do not
follow a single approach, and there is no overarching paradigm of corruption to
determine what forms of official misconduct should be designated as crimes.'They limit the forms of corruption largely to two-party exchanges in which the
governmental official receives a benefit provided by a party with an interest in the
outcome of a decision or other exercise of authority. Corruption, however, is not
confined solely to bribery-type situations, and criminal definitions of corruption
relying on the bribery paradigm leave out activities by officials that result in
personal enrichment
through the misuse of authority that are as improper as the
6
receipt of a bribe.'
1998), available at http://www.coe.fr/cm/cmdocs/1998/98cm54.htm.
The United Nations adopted an International Code of Conduct for Public Officials in
1996 as a means to assist member nations in fighting corruption, but it does not call upon
UN members to adopt new legislation. See United Nations: General Assembly Res. 51/59
on Action Against Corruption, Dec. 12, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 1039 (1996).
13. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 456 ("Although the term 'corruption' is open to all
sorts of interpretations, once something has been at least plausibly swept into the corruption
category, the discursive balance of forces changes. Efforts to eliminate the practice are
harder to oppose.").
14. IACAC, supra note 8, at 729, art. VI(1)(c).
15. The Conventions have been criticized for being too narrowly drawn because the
principle crime is bribery and not a broader offense of corruption. See Ndiva Kofele-Kale,
The Right to a Corruption-FreeSociety as an Individual and Collective Human Right:
Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime under InternationalLaw, 34 INT'L LAW. 149,

157 (2000). There is no question that bribery is the quintessential form of public
corruption, but the issue is how far the criminal law can be extended to other instances of
misuse of official authority for personal gain.
16. Miguel Schloss, the Executive Director of Transparency International, offered a
broad interpretation of bribery that covers a variety of forms of corruption and
governmental misconduct that fall outside the traditional definition of a bribe:
[I]t should be understood that bribery encompasses payoffs for a wide
variety of illicit activities: (i) getting around licenses, permits, and
signatures; (ii) acquiring monopolistic power through entry barriers
to competitors; (iii) access to public goods, including legal or
uneconomic awards of public procurement contracts; (iv) access to
the use of public physical assets or their outright stripping and
appropriation; (v) access to preferential financial assets, such as
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The focus at the international level on encouraging countries to adopt
broad criminal statutes to deter and punish corrupt activities by public officials
raises the question of how the law in the United States addresses corruption. The
United States has been among the leaders in seeking international and regional
agreements supporting the adoption of stronger anti-corruption laws. The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 17 enacted by Congress in 1977 to address the
problem of transnational bribery of public officials by American corporations
18
seeking overseas business, provided the framework for the OECD Convention.
The FCPA expanded the jurisdiction of federal prosecutors to include corrupt acts
credit; (vi) illegal trade in goods banned for security or health
considerations, such as drugs and nuclear materials; (vii) illicit
financial transactions, such as money laundering and insider trading;
(viii) influencing administrative or legislative actions; and (ix)
influencing judicial decisions.
Miguel Schloss, Symposium FightingInternationalCorruptionand Bribery in the 21st
Century,Luncheon Address, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 469,471 (2000).
Professor Salbu criticizes the effort to adopt domestic and international prohibitions on
corruption because they appear to be largely ineffectual. He states, "If both the FCPA and
domestic laws in foreign countries have failed to have any serious impact on bribery, is
there any reason to assume that additional legislation would have a greater effect?" Steven
R. Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational
Bribery, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657, 681 (2000). He argues that criminal laws "serve[ a
very limited role" in the fight against corruption. Id. The point is a good one, but one
should not infer that the criminal lav must be ineffective because it has not stopped
corruption. While the criminal law alone cannot end corruption, it provides the core
method of attacking past instances of corruption. Policies designed to eliminate the
institutional structures that encourage corruption may ultimately have a greater impact than
individual prosecutions, but criminal prohibitions will always be a necessary aspect of
every effort to eradicate and punish corruption. This article argues in favor of broader laws
to reach forms of corruption that fall outside the paradigm of bribery, understanding the
limitations of any criminal provision as a limited, but necessary, tool.
17. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
78m(b)(2), 78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, and 78ff(2000)). Congress has amended the FCPA
twice, in 1988 as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (1988), and again in 1998 to conform to the OECD
Convention in the International Antibribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
18. See Barbara Crutchfield George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of
GlobalAntibriberyLegislation:A CriticalAnalysis of CurrentDomestic andInternational
Efforts Toward the Reduction ofBusiness Corruption,32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 18
(1999) ("It is certain that the FCPA has provided a relevant legislative model for other
multilateral organizations and nations because it remains the sole statutory prohibition of
bribery of foreign officials by business for the purpose of obtaining contracts."). For a
thorough review of the history and structure of the FCPA, see Christopher F. Corr & Judd
Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't? The OECD Convention and the
GlobalizationofAnti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1249 (1999).
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committed outside the United States, and established a standard for extending the
criminal law beyond a nation's borders. In 1999, Vice-President Gore hosted the
Global Forum on Fighting Corruption in Washington, D.C., in which 90 nations
sent representatives to discuss a broad array of topics related to public
corruption.' 9 The United States is a key participant in the international effort to
enhance the investigation and prosecution of corruption, and views its laws as an
important guide for other nations seeking to adopt broader prohibitions in this
area. 20 For example, the United States Senate ratified the IACAC with an explicit
understanding that it did not need to adopt any new laws to meet the Convention's
requirements because "[t]here is an extensive'21
network of laws already in place...
that criminalize a wide range of corrupt acts.
Although it holds itself out as an example for other nations to follow, the
United States does not have a coherent set of domestic anti-corruption laws.
Instead, one can best describe the federal law as a hodgepodge.22 One provision
of federal law targets bribery and unlawful gratuities to federal officials, 23 while a
different one addresses corruption connected to state and local programs that
receive federal funds. 24 In addition to these narrower criminal provisions, judicial
interpretation expanded the Mail Fraud statute 25 and the Hobbs Act 26 to reach
official misconduct even though Congress did not adopt the provisions expressly
to address corruption. Determining what types of conduct by public officials
violate federal criminal provisions, and how broadly or narrowly those statutes
19. Global Forum on Fighting Corruption: Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and
Security Officials, Feb. 23-25, 1999, availableat http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/
integrity/documents/gore.html.
20. See Letter of Transmittal from Department of State to President Clinton (March
24, 1998), reprinted in INT'L ECON. L. DOC. IEL-I-B21 (available on WESTLAW)
[hereinafter Letter of Transmittal] ("[O]ne of the objectives of the [IACAC] is to have the
rest of the nations of the hemisphere develop a body of laws on corruption comparable to
that which exists in the United States."); Hearing on the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, 106th Cong. (May 2, 2000) (statement of Alan Larson, Under
Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs) [hereinafter Under
Secretary Larson Statement] (discussing the "strong position the United States has
historically taken in opposition to corruption, and the fact that our laws and policies on this
issue are at the forefront internationally..
21. 146 CONG. REC. S7809 (2000).
22. The United States is not alone in having a disjointed approach to corruption. The
English law of corruption has been described as "an area of law riddled by logical
inconsistency and historical hangovers." Peter Alldridge, Reforming the Criminal Law of
Corruption, I1 CRIM. L.F. 287, 287 (2000).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). A violation of this provision requires that the program
receive over $10,000 of federal funds in a 12-month period. Id.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). The Wire Fraud statute reaches the same corrupt
conduct as the Mail Fraud statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
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should be interpreted, has been the subject of continuing controversy. Congress
has not defined a crime of public corruption,27 nor established the extent to which

the federal power should be applied to the corrupt acts of state and local oflicials.
Judicial interpretations of statutes employed in corruption cases leave the scope of
the law unclear because the provisions are viewed in isolation, without reference
to any overarching statutory structure for combating public corruption. The fault
lies not so much with the courts as with Congress, which has not undertaken the
task of enacting a clear set of provisions to deal with corruption at the various
levels of government. Lacking a coherent system of anti-corruption laws at the
federal level, it is unclear what limits, if any, there are to applying criminal
provisions to regulate public affairs, or whether certain types of conduct should be
left to the civil and administrative apparatus. Nations seeking unambiguous laws
prohibiting corruption may find that the United States does not provide a model of
clarity in this area.
Despite the lack of a coherent set of laws at the federal level, the United
States can offer guidance on addressing misconduct that falls outside the bribery
paradigm involving the misuse of official authority for personal gain. The Mail
Fraud statute is a good example of a powerful anti-corruption statute that reaches
conduct by both public officials and employees of private enterprises that does not
necessarily involve the typical two-party exchange found in bribery situations2 8
Instead, the provision focuses on the personal enrichment of the defendant through
dishonesty in the exercise of authority rather than the payment and receipt of a
bribe. International efforts to address corruption should consider adoption of a
provision like the Mail Fraud statute's prohibition on officials acting to deprive
the citizenry of the right of honest services as a means to punish the misuse of
public office for personal enrichment even in the absence of a two-party
transaction, such as a bribe.
This Article analyzes the International Conventions that address public
corruption and compare their approaches with the structure of United States laws
applied to prosecute corruption. The focus is on the federal government rather
than the states because the international agreements on corruption apply to the
national governments in the first instance, and it is the federal law that will
provide guidance to, and be influenced by, the development at the international
level of a coherent body of law on the subject.2 9 Part II reviews briefly some
27. See Sara Sun Beale, Comparingthe Scope of the FederalGovernment'sAuthority
to Prosecute Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising
Conclusions and a Proposal,51 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 700 (2000) ("[F]ederal jurisdiction
over political corruption at the state and local level is gradually expanding to fulfill the
same functions as the statutes punishing corruption within the federal system").
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
29. One of the understandings of the United States Senate in ratifying the IACAC
was that, due to the federal system of government in the United States, the Convention
"does not impose obligations with respect to the conduct of officials other than federal
officials." 146 CONG. REC. 57809 (2000). The United States took that position in
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formulations of a definition of corruption that encompass a broad array of
conduct, from the clearly illegal to the outer limits of ethical conduct and fair
administration of the law. Part III describes the approaches to public corruption in
the IACAC, OECD Convention, and Council Convention. The OECD and
Council Conventions focus exclusively on bribery as the sole form of corruption
subject to prosecution, although the Council Convention tries to reach an
additional form of corruption it terms trading in influence that largely resembles
bribery. The IACAC begins with bribery, and then suggests additional forms of
corruption that focus on the personal enrichment of the public official as the
linchpin for criminal liability. The IACAC is closer to the broader anti-corruption
provisions found in United States law. None of the Conventions address gratuities
given to officials that are designed to seek future benefits unrelated to a specific
exercise of authority, a form of corruption that involves influence buying. A
related issue not addressed in the Conventions is the topic of political campaign
contributions, and how corruption law should treat these payments that are
designed to influence the exercise of official authority.
Part IV analyzes the scope of the United States laws on corruption in
light of the position asserted in ratifying the IACAC that no additional provisions
were needed to comply with that Convention's obligations, and how the law in the
United States can shape further development of a uniform approach to corruption.
The first section considers the interrelated crimes of bribery and unlawful
gratuities. While bribery is the most commonly identified form of public
corruption, the offer and receipt of a gratuity is also a criminal offense that raises a
difficult interpretive issue regarding the distinction between a bribe and a gift, and
what types of gifts should rise to the level of a violation of the criminal law. The
second section analyzes the relationship of political campaign contributions to
prosecutions for corruption. The global effort to combat corruption must consider
how the process of financing political campaigns can be accommodated to the
effort to eliminate corruption. The third section reviews the broadest anticorruption statute in the federal law-the Mail Fraud statute-that reaches any
"scheme to defraud" that deprives the government and citizenry of the right of
honest services owed by public officials. The analysis of this provision is
important to understanding how broadly the criminal law can sweep to address
forms of corruption that do not fit the bribery paradigm when officials misuse
public authority for personal benefit. The Article discusses how anti-corruption
law should be expanded along the lines sketched out in the Mail Fraud statute to
prohibit schemes by which officials enrich themselves and others improperly
negotiating the Convention when the leader of the delegation stated that "countries with
federal systems of government may not be able to bind their states and municipalities to the
obligations under the Convention." Letter of Transmittal, supra note 20; see Under
Secretary Larson Statement, supra note 20 ("At the conclusion of the negotiations [for the
IACAC], the United States delegate read a statement into the record, asserting that we
understood the Convention did not impose obligations with respect to officials other than
federal officials for countries with a federal system of government.").
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through influence-peddling, skimming, nepotism, and other types of misuse of
public authority.
LI. EFFORTS TO DEFINE PUBLIC CORRUPTION
In the criminal law, the fundamental form of corruption is bribery. 0 In
his widely-acclaimed book Bribes, Judge Noonan described it as follows: "The
core of the concept of a bribe is an inducement improperly influencing the
performance of a public function meant to be gratuitously exercised." 31 Every
definition of corruption incorporates bribery as the principal form of misconduct,
and then usually seeks to expand the concept to cover a broader array of conduct.
Professor Lowenstein cogently described the problem with crafting laws to
prosecute corruption beyond bribery:
[T]he crime of bribery is the black core of a series of
concentric circles representing the degrees of impropriety in
official behavior. In this conception, a series of gray circles
surround the bribery core, growing progressively lighter as
they become more distant from the center, until they blend
into the surrounding white32area that represents perfectly
proper and innocent conduct.
Judge Noonan pointed out that bribery is one form of reciprocity, and that "[a
33
bribe is not distinguished from other ways of eliciting a benevolent response.
Moreover, even within the crime of bribery, there is uncertainty regarding the
linkage required between the payment and the official act, and what intent the
offeror and public official must have for the transaction to come within the
criminal prohibition.
Scholars outside the law advance various definitions of what constitutes
corruption involving public officials, and there is no single description of the
phenomenon embraced by all disciplines. 34 Professor Nye's analysis of the effect

30. See George D. Brown, The Gratuities Offense and the RICO Approach to
Independent Counsel Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.L 2045, 2051 (1998) ("Bribes are an
example, perhaps the quintessential example, of political corruption.").
31. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES xi (1984).
32. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics,32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 786 (1985).
33. NOONAN, supra note 31, at 4.
34. See Tevfik F. Nas et al., A Policy-Oriented Theory of Corruption, 80 AM. POL

SCI.REV. 107 (1986) ("There remains a need for an internally consistent theoretical model
and an analytical definition [of corruption] which would lead to important policy
considerations.").
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of corruption in developing nations contains one of the best-known and most
detailed descriptions of the phenomenon:
Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties
of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding
influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of a
reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of
trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive
relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal
appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses). 35
Professor Key's exhaustive study of graft in American history described both
bribery and what he labeled "auto-corruption," which occurred when a public
official "secures for himself the administrative privilege which would be secured
by an outsider by bribery. He awards contracts to himself, perhaps using dummy6
corporations, which would go to reward a contractor in the organization."
Professors Peters and Welch focused on the four components "involved in every
political act or exchange. We believe this process can meaningfully be partitioned
into the 'public official' involved, the actual 'favor' provided by the public
official, the 'payoff gained by the '37
public official, and the 'donor' of the payoff
and/or 'recipient' of the 'favor' act.
Professor Rose-Ackerman's extensive economic analysis of corruption
approached the issue in this way: "Private individuals and firms who want
favorable treatment may be willing to pay to obtain it. Payments are corrupt if
they are illegally made to public agents with the goal of obtaining a benefit or
avoiding a cost." 38 Professor Kennedy noted that "[c]orruption has become a code
word for 'rent-seeking'-using power to extract a higher price than that which
would be possible in an arms-length or freely competitive bargain-and for
practices which privilege locals. ' 39 Professor Gronbeck, a linguist, gave a
straightforward definition, that "the term 'political corrugtion' encompasses those
acts whereby private gain is made at public expense." 4 Professor Eisenstadt, a
35. J. S. Nye, Corruption and PoliticalDevelopment: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 419 (1967); EDWARD C. BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE

315 (Glencoe, IL Free Press 1961).
36. V. 0. Key, Jr., Techniques of PoliticalGraft, in POLITICAL CORRUPTION 46, 48
(Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed. 1970).
37. Peters & Welch, supra note 1.
38. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION, supra note 6, at 9.

39. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 460.
40. Bruce E. Gronbeck, The Rhetoric of Political Corruption, in POLITICAL
CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK 173, 173 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston,
Victor T. Le Vine eds., 1999). The World Bank has a similarly straightforward definition
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historian, offered a similar description, that "[p]olitical corruption means that a
public official has perverted the office entrusted to his care, that he has broken a
public trust for private gain." 4'
The definitions offered by scholars in other disciplines take a broad view
of what constitutes corruption, beginning with bribery as the paradigm of a
corrupt transaction. The definitions assume-at least implicitly-a core form of
conduct that is obviously illegal, and therefore corrupt per se. The academic
analyses then move to a more expansive description, beyond the narrower
confines of the criminal law, that incorporate broader social manifestations of
corruption.42 While these definitions include much conduct that is clearly illegal,
the goal is not to offer a description of what a criminal law should incorporate.
Indeed, the definitions of corruption often combine notions of ethical conduct
43 and
fair governance with crimes like bribery, extortion and influence-peddling.
Adding to the difficulty in defining corruption is the absence of reliable
measures of its pervasiveness beyond general perceptions that a government or
ministry is corrupt.44 Relying solely on conduct that constitutes a criminal
violation would not demonstrate whether corruption is rampant because the
misconduct is so difficult to detect that conviction rates provide little insight into
the scope of the problem. 45 Moreover, corruption in most instances occurs
without a victim, at least in the common sense of that term as a person not a party
of corruption as "the use of public office for private gain." Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel
Kaufinann, Corruption and Development, FIN. AND DEV., Mar. 1998, at 7, availableat
http:lAvww.worldbank.orgfanddlenglishl0398/articlesO20398.htm
41. Abraham S. Eisenstadt, PoliticalCorruptionin American History, in POLITICAL
CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK, supra note 40, at 537-38.
42. For example, Professor Rose-Ackerman's definition states that the payments
must be "illegally made" to be corrupt. ROSE-ACKERMAN CORRUPTION, supra note 6, at
9.
43. See PETER DELEON, THINKING ABOUT POLITICAL CORRUPTION 22 (1993)
("Legality would seemingly be the key component, but that would imply that only illegal
later see to be shortsighted.").
acts are corrupt, an implication we wilIl
44. See Duane Windsor & Kathleen A. Getz, Multilateral Cooperationto Combat
Corruption:Normative Regimes Despite Afired Motives andDiverse Values, 33 CORNELL
INT'L L.L 731, 750 (2000) ("Empirical data concerning the incidence and consequences of
these various segments of bribery and corruption are notoriously difficult to collect and
validate. Generally speaking, only poor and typically impressionistic information is
available."). Transparency International publishes a Corruption Perception Index based on
a composite index drawing on a number of polls and surveys carried out among business
people, the general public and country analysts that ranks countries according to the
perception of corruption in their government. The organization also publishes a Bribe
Payers Survey rating the frequency with which businesses from a country pay bribes to
secure contracts. See http://wvw.trausparency.de (last visited Oct. 24, 2001); cf.Schloss,
supra note 16, at 475-79 (discussing goals of Transparency International).
45. ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note 3, at xiv ("The student of corruption and
corruption control is bedeviled by the absence of data or indicators of the corruption rate.
No one knows for sure whether official corruption has diminished over time.").
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to the violation who suffers the effects of a crime, and who may report it to the
authorities. The hallmarks of corruption are stealth and obfuscation between
ostensibly cooperating parties, and the pursuit of criminal cases can be hampered
by the involvement of offenders who possess a good reputation and high social
among the most difficult crimes to
standing. Public corruption is certainly
46
investigate and prosecute successfully.
The imprecision regarding what constitutes a corrupt act arises in part
because of the term's rhetorical potency. Politicians invoke the specter of
corruption to denigrate opponents and call into question the motives underlying
decisions they oppose, sometimes merely to further their own political interests.
In American political history, the deadlock after the 1824 presidential election was
broken by what opponents termed the "Corrupt Bargain" that resulted in the
House of Representatives choosing John Quincy Adams as President over Andrew
Jackson, the winner of the popular vote and recipient of the most electoral votes.48
One side's accusation of corruption can, of course, mean that the opponent is
compromising to achieve a consensus to further the good of the polity. Political
rhetoric does not always correspond to what might be designated as illegal, or
even unethical. Yet, the definition of what is corrupt continues to expand in
response to public pressure-often fueled by media accounts of official
transgressions-on the executive and legislative branches of governments to adopt
46. See United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated on
other grounds by 240 F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("When faced with competing explanations
for some specific misconduct, conduct which could be either innocuous or illicit depending
upon the particular motivation involved, the inquiry will rarely be clear or neat."); Barbara
Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of Industrialized Nations,
Developing Nations, Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-Governmental
Organizations:A Pivotal Complement to CurrentAnti-CorruptionInitiatives,33 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 547, 551 (2000) ("Bribery assumes many forms and, due to its characteristically
clandestine nature, it is often difficult to detect.").
47. See NOONAN, supra note 31, at xiii ("[A]ccusations of bribery are often
politically motivated or are made in order to satisfy certain social or psychic needs; one
cannot judge from the accusations alone whether acts of bribery have actually occurred").
Political scientists note that there is a "negative relation between information about
corruption and electoral support for the party in control of the presidency." See Tim
Fackler & Tse-min Lin, PoliticalCorruption and PresidentialElections, 1929-1992, 57 J.
POL. 971, 989 (1995).
48. See Marc W. Kruman, The Second American Party System and the
Transformation of Revolutionary Republicanism, 12 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 509, 521 (1992)
("Fear turned to outrage when John Quincy Adams, after winning the presidency with
Henry Clay's aid, appointed Clay as his secretary of state. Dubbed the 'corrupt bargain' by
Jackson's men, whose candidate had gained a plurality of the popular and electoral college
votes, the apparent pact convinced Jacksonians that Adams had purchased the presidency
and anointed his own successor."). See also NOONAN, supra note 31, at 449 (describing
the agreement between Adams and Clay that provided the votes for Adams' election as a
reciprocity similar to a bribe).
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progressively stricter laws to demonstrate that society will not countenance any
4
On a global scale, commentators are advocates of
abuse of the public trust.O
recognizing the basic right of individuals to live in a society free from corruption,
arguing that nations should consider corrupt acts by public officials a crime under
international law 5
The definitions demonstrate that corruption is an expanding-and quite
malleable-concept. Efforts to adopt new criminal laws to address broader
concerns about official misconduct, therefore, should move beyond the bribery
paradigm as the predominant form of corruption. The question that arises is how
the law should define corruption as a criminal offense, one that often carries a
substantial penalty for those convicted. A law, unlike a scholarly definition, must
state the elements of the offense with sufficient precision to inform those subject
to its strictures of what is criminal conduct and what penalties they may incur for
a violation. The broader the scope of the law, the greater the possibility that
arguably acceptable conduct will come within the criminal provision and result in
punishment for acts that are not morally blameworthy.

M. THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC CORRUPTION
The debilitating effect of official corruption on transnational commerce
provided a strong impetus for the adoption of the International Conventions. High
profile bribery and corruption cases involving leaders of various nations,
including South Korea, Italy, Brazil and Peru, spurred international organizations
to address corruption.5 1 The United States had long been the only nation to adopt
49. See ANECHIARICO & JACOBS, supra note 3, at 6 ("Over the course of some fifty
years, there has been a'big change. Much conduct that was legal a generation ago is now
corrupt; yesterday's 'honest graft' is today's illegal conflict of interest.").
50. See Brian C. Harms, Note, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the
InternationalRealm: A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption,33 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 159, 189 (2000) ("If one sees indigenous spoilation as a violation of human
rights much like torture or slavery, then it becomes an international crime that circumvents
state sovereignty."); see also Kofele-Kale, supra note 15, at 152. Professor Kofele-Kale
argues that the right of economic self-determination supports the basic human right to live
in a corruption-free society, and this right "is inherently a basic human right because life,
dignity, and other important human values depend on this right." Id. at 163. As a universal
human right, contravention of it by corrupt officials would not only violate domestic lawv
but also would be a crime under international law. Id. at 166. But see Claire M.
Dickerson, PoliticalCorruption as an International Offense (Summary of Remarks), 94
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 56, 56 (2000) ("The elimination of corruption, too, can be a
violation of human rights, in particular the cultural rights of indigenous populations. For
example, the OECD antibribery convention may be viewed as a conspiracy by the
developed countries to protect multinational corporations by reducing bribe payments, but
without considering the cultural norms of the payee's country's population.").
51. See Hess and Dunfee, supra note 2, at 601(discussing convictions of two former
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criminal sanctions for bribery of foreign officials in international business
transactions; much of the world resisted American efforts to have countries
employ their criminal law to prohibit bribery by domestic enterprises of officials
outside their borders.52 The growth of the global economy in the 1990s saw a
dramatic change in attitude about the need to outlaw bribery and other forms of
corruption in transnational business. Bribery creates significant barriers to global
trade and, while it may reward some entities with increased revenues, ultimately
corruption makes international business more costly for all.53 Changes in the
global economy have made it possible for a concerted push at the international
level to enact broad anti-corruption legislation that translates the broad sentiment
against corruption into concrete criminal prohibitions.
The starting point for the International Conventions is defining the crime
of corruption so that member and signatory states can enact or strengthen their
domestic law. Once the fundamental crime is established, nations can enact
additional provisions prohibiting particular forms of corruption involving the
misuse of government authority that is of sufficient harm to call for criminal
sanctions.
A. The OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
The OAS is comprised of 34 nations in the Western Hemisphere. 54 In
December 1994, at the First Summit of the Americas, the heads of state of the
OAS member nations issued a Plan of Action that called for, inter alia, the
development

Presidents of South Korea, former Italian Prime Minister, and impeachment of President of
Brazil); Nichols, supra note 5, at 639 ("The corruption-related turmoil faced by the United
States twenty-five years ago, however, pales in comparison to that experienced by many
European and Latin American countries, as well as Japan in the last ten years.").
52. See George & Lacey, supra note 46, at 556 (FCPA "signified the U.S.
government's unilateral stance against business corruption and resulted in prolonged,
vehement objection by the U.S. business community."); see also Salbu, supra note 5, at 54
("In the 1980s and early 1990s, writers voiced concern that the United States' unilateral
hard line on bribery was paternalistic, expensive, and subjected the country to a global
competitive disadvantage in bidding for international contracts .... ).
53. See Edgardo Buscaglia & Maria Dakolias, An Analysis of the Causes of
Corruption in the Judiciary, 30 (Supp.) L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 95, 96 (1999) ("Even
though in the short run corruption can have a positive economic effect, in the long run the
results are likely to be costly in terms of economic efficiency, political legitimacy, and
basic fairness.").
54. The OAS is a regional agency authorized under Article 52 of the United Nations
Charter. See U.N. CHARTER art. 52. A list of the 34 members of the OAS is available at
http://www.oas.org/EN/MSTATES/bckgrdme.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2001).

Public Corruption

within the OAS, with due regard to applicable treaties and
national legislation, [of] a hemispheric approach to acts of
corruption in both the public and private sectors that would
include extradition and prosecution of individuals so charged,
through negotiation of a new hemispheric agreement or new
arrangements55 within existing frameworks for international
cooperation.
One of the primary goals of the United States in the drafting process for the
IACAC was inclusion of a provision covering transnational bribery similar to the
FCPA. 6 In March 1996, at the Specialized Conference on the Draft InterAmerican Convention Against Corruption, the delegates adopted the IACAC and
sent it to each member nation for signature and ratification." The Convention
requires nations to change their current laws and adopt new provisions covering
both domestic acts of corruption and bribery in transnational business
transactions. The United States is one of 21 nations to ratify the IACAC, and the
Convention is considered the most far-reaching international accord in the field
because it reaches both transnational bribery and domestic corruption by
promoting a uniform approach through the criminal law. 8
The IACAC takes a broad view of corruption that includes both bribery
and other misuses of office for personal enrichment. Article VI(l) defines three
principal "acts of corruption":
a. The solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly, by a
government official or a person who performs public
functions, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit,
such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself or for
another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission
in the performance of his public functions;

55. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, 34 I.L.M.
808, 818-19 (1995).
56. See Letter of Transmittal,supra note 20 ("Especially noteworthy is the obligation
to criminalize the bribery of foreign government officials. This provision was included in
the Convention at the behest of the United States negotiating delegation.").
57. See Luis F. rnienez, The Inter-American Convention Against Comiption, 92
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 157, 157 (1998) (describing the Convention drafting process
in the OAS).
58. See David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The
Emergence of an InternationalLegal Consensus, 18 NW. . INT'L L. & BUS. 457, 478
(1998) (The IACAC "went much further than any other actual or proposed international
agreement in seeking not only to make bribery of foreign officials a crime in the country of
the exporting firm or individuals, but also in encouraging local governments to deal more
effectively with the problem of domestic corruption.").
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b. The offering or granting, directly or indirectly, to a
government official or a person who performs public
functions, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit,
such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself or for
another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission
in the performance of his public functions; [and]
c. Any act or omission in the discharge of his duties by a
government official or a person who performs public functions
for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for
a third party.. 9
The first two acts of corruption entail a violation by the public official receiving
the benefit and the offeror of the benefit, so that each step in the transaction
constitutes a separate criminal offense. The item that may constitute the
corruption is defined broadly as "any article of monetary value, or other
benefit." 60 The expansive subject matter of the illicit exchange that includes any
"other benefit" means that the underlying transaction should not be limited solely
to economic exchanges, and the transfer may involve an intangible gain and not
just money or property. For example, a "benefit" conferred on a government
official may include hiring or promoting a relative, purchasing goods from an
entity in which the official has a vested interest, and perhaps even the offeror's
willingness to protect an official's interests at a later time, i.e. an exchange of
favors.
The first two acts of corruption in the IACAC reflect the traditional
crime of bribery. The classic example of corruption is a payment involving a
quidpro quo between the offeror and public official in which each party acts with
the intent that the transfer influence the exercise of governmental authority. The
receipt of the item alone would not constitute bribery absent proof of the
participants' intent and the relationship of the transaction to the official action.
59. JACAC, supra note 8, art. VI, § 1. There are two other acts of corruption
described that are not in themselves corrupt, but relate to an underlying act of corruption.
The IACAC states that corruption incorporates:
d. The fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from any of
the acts referred to in this article; and
e. Participation as a principal, coprincipal, instigator, accomplice or

accessory after the fact, or in any other manner, in the commission
or attempted commission of, or in any collaboration or conspiracy
to commit, any of the acts referred to in this article.
Id. These provisions broaden the scope of corruption but do not change the basic
definition of the crime.
60. See IA CA C, supra note 8, art. VI § 1(a) & (b).
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Consistent with this common understanding of bribery, Article VI(l)(a)-(b)
incorporate the requirement of an "exchange" of the benefit "for any act or
omission in the performance of his public functions." 61 The language of this
prohibition does not alter or expand the concept
of bribery, and the IACAC makes
62
this provision the core form of corruption.
It is questionable whether the elements of the bribery offense also reach
a gratuity, -whichdiffers from a bribe because it is a reward to an official that does
not entail a quidpro quo exchange. A gift may be given either before or after the
decision, while a bribe must take place before the governmental action because
the offer is the precondition for the corrupt outcome of the process. The IACAC
refers to the receipt of a "gift, favor, promise or advantage for himself' in the
definition of the crime, but these terms only relate to the type of benefit that can
qualify as the consideration for a corrupt exchange. The IACAC requires that
whatever benefit the official receive be "in exchange for" the governmental act,
which means that a gift bestowed after the decision would not meet
63 the quidpro
quo requirement of Article VI(l)(a)-(b), absent a prior agreement.
The IACAC took a more expansive approach in the third form of
corruption, making it a crime when the government official acts or fails to act "for
the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party." Unlike
the bribery transaction, this provision does not require a quidpro quo linking the
receipt of the benefit to the official's conduct. There need not be another party
providing the benefit, and it appears that the official's conduct need not be
otherwise tainted by the acceptance or realization of the benefit. Article VI(l)(c)
focuses primarily on the official's intent for acting or failing to act, asking
whether the receipt of some identifiable benefit was related to the official's
performance of his duties. The act of corruption is the illicit receipt or
appropriation of a benefit that occurs through the performance of official duties. 6'
On the one hand, a government official receives a salary for discharging
his duties, so there is no improper gain from the exercise of authority in that case
because the person is entitled to receive the benefit; i.e., there is nothing "illicit"
about the payment. On the other hand, even an apparently proper exercise of
authority that provides an additional benefit to the official or another person on
whose behalf the official seeks to confer the benefit would violate this provision
if the official made the decision, at least in part, to produce a gain for himself or
another to which the person was not entitled. It is not the exercise of
governmental authority that is corrupt, as in a bribery situation, but the official's
realization of a gain derived from the decision. There must be a link between the
decision and the benefit to demonstrate the corrupt character of the conduct, but
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Jimenez, supra note 57, at 159 ("The expression 'in exchange for' used in
Article 6 introduces the delicate element of proof that an act was the direct result of the
request or offer of benefits to the public official.").
64. See L4CAC, supra note 8, art. VI § (1)(c).
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the IACAC does not require that the connection be as close as that required for a
bribe, which calls for an "exchange., 65 The corruption can involve a legitimate
exercise of authority--or at least one that does not cause any harm to the
government-generating a gain to the official who is not otherwise entitled to
receive the benefit traceable to the decision.
Article VI(1)(c) marks an important step-apparently overlooked or
misunderstood by the United States-that expanded the definition of corruption
by making the misuse of authority for personal gain a separate offense even
though it does not involve a two-party transaction. The United States, however,
viewed Article VI(1)(c) as only a form of an attempt crime that is a precursor to
the bribery-type transactions described in Article VI(1)(a)-(b), and not as a
separate form of corruption. The State Department's analysis of the conduct
described in Article VI(l)(c) stated that the provision "would embrace a situation
in which an individual took some preparatory action unknown to anyone, with the
purpose of profiting illicitly at some future point."66 Similarly, the United States
Senate's Understanding in ratifying the Convention asserted that there is no
general attempt statute in federal law and that "Article VI(1)(c) ... by its literal

terms would embrace a single preparatory act done with the requisite 'purpose' of
profiting illicitly at some future time, even though the course of conduct is neither
pursued, nor in any sense consummated. The United States will not criminalize
such conduct per se .

.

."67

The view of Article VI(l)(c) as only a type of

attempt provision, and perhaps an extension of the criminal law unacceptable
under the principles of United States criminal law, ignored the clear language in
Article VI(1)(c) that defines a different form of corruption beyond bribery, and
not simply conduct that may be an attempt to commit the bribery outlawed in
Article VI(l)(a)-(b).
Under the common law in the United States, an attempt to commit a
crime is viewed generally as a violation once conduct "has passed the stage of
preparation, and has moved to the point of perpetration, of the offense., 6 ' The
conduct must be sufficient to establish the defendant's requisite specific intent to
continue forward to complete the crime, despite the failure to complete the
65. A gratuity given after the fact would not come within this third form of
corruption in the Article VI because the government action would not be made to obtain the
benefit. As with a bribe, this form of corruption has a temporal requirement, that the
benefit be a component of the decision and not a happenstance arising from it. See infra,
text at notes 129-139 (discussing the difference between a bribe and an unlawful gratuity
under United States law).
66. Letter of Transmittal,supra note 20.
67. 146 CONG. REC. S7809 (2000).
68. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed.), § 27.02[B] at
374 (2001); See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(C) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)

(defining one form of an attempt to commit a crime as "an act or omission constituting a
substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the
offense.")
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offense. Article VI(1)(c)'s language does not comprise attempted bribery, which
requires a two-party exchange, nor is it limited to a "single preparatory act."
Instead, the provision targets one or more acts of an official designed to illicitly
obtain benefits in a manner distinct from receipt of an advantage. The corrupt
conduct may be one act, or a series of acts, and the provision requires proof
linking the exercise of authority to the "purpose" of obtaining the improper
benefit, the highest level of intent in the criminal law. The concern expressed in
the United States Senate's Understanding of Article VI(1)(c) that the provision
would reach preparatory acts is true of any attempt crime, that the conduct must
69
pass from preparation to perpetration before it is a violation of the criminal law.
The language of Article VI(l)(c) does not alter the law of attempt or
impermissibly expand the meaning of corrupt acts because the conduct must
establish the criminal purpose of the official. Viewing Article VI(l)(c) solely as
an attempt provision also overlooks Article VI(l)(e), which defines the scope of
potential liability for perpetrators to include those who participate in an act of
corruption "as a principal, coprincipal, instigator, accomplice or accessory after
the fact, or in any other manner .... 70 Unlike the corruption in Article VI(l)(a)(b), which involves an improper payment and receipt, Article VI(l)(c) defines a
different offense based on personal enrichment obtained through an exercise of
government authority undertaken with the intent to benefit the official. This
offense is similar to the Mail Fraud statute's prohibition on fraudulent schemes
that involve a deprivation of the right of honest services. Under both approaches,
it is the link between the decision and the self-enrichment that forms the act of
corruption, not limited solely to a third-party payment to an official. 7'
69. See Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901) (Classic description by
Chief Justice Holmes of the distinction between preparation and perpetration, that
"preparation is not an attempt. But some preparations may amount to an attempt. It is a
question of degree.").
70. LCAC, supra note 8, art. VI § (1)(e).
71. The apparent confusion of the United States regarding the type of misconduct
described in Article VI(1)(c) was further reflected in its response to an OAS questionnaire
seeking in formation from nations that ratified the IACAC regarding implementation of the
Convention. The response to the question whether the United States prohibits the acts
described in the provision was "Yes," and identified 18 U.S.C. § 201 as the specific
provision reaching the act of corruption. Section 201, however, only reaches bribery and
unlawful gratuities provided to a federal official, not the broader form of corruption
involving the exercise of authority to gain personal benefits. See Working Group on
Probity and Public Ethics, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs Permanent Council,
United States Response to Questionnaireon Ratjicationand Implementation of tie InterAmerican Convention on Corruption,Organization of American States at 14 (March 2000),
available at http:xwv.oas.org [hereinafter U.S. QuestionnaireResponse]. The response
did not reiterate the viev that Article VI(1)(c) only reaches attempted corruption, although
the citation to § 201 may mean that the United States views the provision as prohibiting
attempted bribery despite the absence of any language in Article VI(l)(c) indicating that
was the scope of that act of corruption. The response also does not refer to the Mail Fraud
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The IACAC contains additional provisions for OAS members to
consider "to foster the development and harmonization of their domestic law and
the attainment of the purposes of this Convention."
Article XI, entitled
"Progressive Development," suggests prohibiting the following specific forms of
corruption:
a.

The improper use by a government official or a
person who performs public functions, for his own
benefit or that of a third party, of any kind of
classified or confidential information which that
official or person who performs public functions has
obtained because of, or in the performance of, his
functions;

b.

The improper use by a government official or a
person who performs public functions, for his own
benefit or that of a third party, of any kind of
property belonging to the State or to any firm or
institution in which the State has a proprietary
interest, to which that official or person who
performs public functions has access because of, or in
the performance of, his functions;

c.

Any act or omission by any person who, personally
or through a third party, or acting as an intermediary,
seeks to obtain a decision from a public authority
whereby he illicitly obtains for himself or for another
person any benefit or gain; whether or not such act or
omission harms State property; and

d.

The diversion by a government official, for purposes
unrelated to those for which they were intended, for
his own benefit or that of a third party, of any
movable or immovable property, monies or securities
belonging to the State, to an independent agency, or
to an individual, that such official has received by
virtue of his position for puroses of administration,
custody or for other reasons."

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000), which covers both bribery and broader forms of
corruption.
72. JACAC, supra note 8, art. XI.
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These provisions are more specific applications of Article VI(l)(c)'s
prohibition on the misuse of one's office for personal enrichment. Article XI(a),
(b), and (d) deal with the misuse of authority regarding property-including
intangible property such as information-that falls outside the more traditional
form of corruption based on a bribery paradigm. For example, misuse of
confidential information in Article XI(a) is similar to insider trading involving the
theft of confidential information to trade securities when the market is ignorant of
the information. This form of misconduct is becoming more widely recognized as
illegal, even though there is often no tangible loss to particular victims, because
the harm is the damage to the credibility of the market and the unfairness of the
personal enrichment through exploitation of one's position providing access to
confidential information. 73
Article XI(c) is different from the other provisions in the Article by
reaching efforts to tamper with the government's decision-making process
through influence peddling, by which an official sells his ability to affect another
office's exercise of authority. There is no quidproquo exchange of the decision
for the payment, but a broader form of corruption in which influence derived from
public office is sold.74 The provision also makes harm to the government
irrelevant to the crime, so that the propriety of the decision is irrelevant, and the
official need not be successful in affecting the outcome to be guilty of the offense.
Similar to the corruption defined in Article VI(1)(c), Article XI(c) focuses on the
personal benefit derived from office as the foundation for designating the conduct
as corrupt. These provisions expand the definition of corruption by identifying
more subtle forms of misconduct that, while resulting in the personal enrichment
of the official, fall outside the traditional two-party exchange of a bribe.
Article IX of the IACAC advances another means of proving corruption
that takes a very different, and potentially more troublesome, approach to the
issue. The provision; entitled "Illicit Enrichment," states:
[s]ubject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of
its legal system, each State Party that has not yet done so shall
take the necessary measures to establish under its laws as an
offense a significant increase in the assets of a government
official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his
lawful earnings during the performance of his functions.
Among those States Parties that have established illicit

73. See

MARC

I.

STEINBERG,

INTERNATIONAL

SECURITIES

LA\V:

A

CONTEMPORARY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 49 (1999).
74. This prohibition fills a gap in Article VI(1)(c) because the misconduct does not
involve the discharge of the official's duties but the use of the governmental position to
gain a benefit for himself and secure a decision in favor ofthe third party.
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enrichment as an offense, such offense shall be considered an
act of corruption for the purposes of this Convention.75
Unlike the other acts of corruption in Articles VI(l) and XI that focuses on
improper transfers or gains derived from the exercise of governmental authority,
Illicit Enrichment makes a government official's accumulation of significant
wealth a form of corruption. To prove Illicit Enrichment, a State Party need not
establish a link between a particular decision, or any exercise of governmental
authority, and the receipt of particular benefits. 76 The governmental official must
explain the fact of wealth alone, and a failure to provide an adequate explanation
would mean that the official must have traded on the governmental authority
vested in him for personal gain. 77 Article IX is, in effect, corruption without proof
of either a quidproquo or intent to gain illicit benefits from official action. The
circumstantial evidence of unexplained wealth leads-perhaps inexorably-to the
conclusion of some improper exchange or misuse of authority to benefit the
decision maker. Ownership of significant wealth, which is susceptible to proof
through records maintained by third parties, such as banks and brokerages,
becomes an element proving corruption in place of proving the improper exercise
of authority that can be difficult to establish absent cooperating witnesses or
incriminating documents. The IACAC promoted Article IX to make proof of
corruption much easier by removing any requirement to demonstrate a nexus
between a benefit gained by an official and a particular governmental action.78
75. JACAC, supra note 8 art. IX.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The United States noted in its Understanding of the Convention that there are
provisions in United States law that achieve the same outcome as Article IX, including
punishment for failure to make proper financial disclosures and tax evasion. 146 CONG.
REC. S7809 (2000); see Gantz, supra note 58, at 479. A criminal tax prosecution that
would reach the same end as the Illicit Enrichment provision would likely involve a
technique used in the United States to prove tax evasion called the "net worth" method.
Professor Bucy described a net worth case as involving the following:
With an indirect method of proof, the amount of income a defendant
allegedly received is shown circumstantially by adding the amounts
of money deposited by the defendant over a period of time ("bank
deposits" method); calculating the increase in a defendant's visible
wealth, such as new homes, investments, automobiles, boats, etc.
("net worth" method); or simply documenting cash expenditures by a
defendant ("cash expenditure" method). When these indirect methods
of proof reveal an amount of income in excess of the defendant's
income as reported to the IRS, a presumption arises that the
defendant has not reported all of her income. The defendant bears the
burden of rebutting this presumption. Government agents have a duty
to investigate leads provided by a taxpayer regarding nontaxable
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The criminal law in Latin America was the source for Article IX, and
Illicit Enrichment is a crime in ten nations. 79 This provision, added to the IACAC
during the final round of negotiations in 1996 at the insistence of Latin American

nations, s would be problematic if adopted in its current form in the United States
and other jurisdictions that have not already accepted Illicit Enrichment as an
offense. The language of Article IX appears to place the burden of proof on the
government official to explain the fact of significant wealth, which clearly violates
the fundamental principal of due process in the United States that the government

bears the burden of proving all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.81

The introductory language of Article IX reflects that concern by making the
requirement to adopt the provision subject to constitutional limitations of
individual nations. The United States Senate ratified the Convention subject to
the Understanding that it would not adopt the Illicit Enrichment provision outlined
in Article IX because such a law would be "inconsistent with the United
States
' S
Constitution and fundamental principles of the United States legal system. "V

sources of income. In indirect method cases, the government is not
required to disprove every possible source of nontaxable income, or
document the defendant's finances "to a mathematical certainty."
Pamela H. Bucy, Criminal Tax Fraud:The Downfall of Murderers,Madams and Thieves,
29 ARIZ. ST. L.L 639, 664-65 (1997).
79. See Jimenez, supra note 57, at n.8 ("Illicit enrichment is defined as a crime, in
varying degrees of detail, in the laws of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela."); see also Gantz, supra note 58, at
479 (Illicit Enrichment "is important to many Latin American jurisdictions where
investigatory institutions are not always capable of complex investigations."); Working
Group on Probity and Public Ethics, Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs
Permanent Council, Replies to the Questionnaireon Ratification and Implementation ofthe
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Organization of American States, at 25
(Sept. 2000), availableat http:www.oas.org (The nations that have ratified the IACAC that
have criminal prohibitions on Illicit Enrichment are: Argentina, Ecuador, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela.).
80. See Letter ofTransmittal,supra note 20 (Article LX "was included at the instance
of a number of Latin American nations:"); see also Bruce Zagaris & Shaila Lakhani Ohri,
The Emergence of an InternationalEnforcement Regime on TransnationalComption in
the Americas, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 53, 57 & n.15 (describing problems on the
part of the United States with the late insertion of the provision).
81. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("Lest there remain any doubt about the
constitutional statute of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged").
82. 146 CONG. REC. 57809 (2000).
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B. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Officials in International
Business Transactions
The OECD is comprised of 29 member nations that are the leading
exporters in the global economy. The organization is devoted to fostering global
economic development, and it is perhaps the leading international organization
promoting anti-corruption efforts related to cross-border trade. The United States
has long sought an agreement, similar to the FCPA, in which other nations would
prohibit individuals and organizations in their country from engaging in crossborder bribery to obtain or protect international commercial transactions.8" In the
early 1990s, with the increased globalization of business, the OECD responded to
the call of the United States and began work on a convention that would require
nations to make it a criminal offense to pay a bribe to an official of another nation
to secure business contracts?84 In December 1997, the 29 members of the OECD
and five other nations 8s signed the OECD Convention that calls on the signatory
states to amend their domestic law to criminalize bribery of foreign officials and
to foster cooperation among nations in pursuing prosecutions. The United
86 States
amended the FCPA in 1998 to conform to the Convention's requirements.
The OECD Convention is concerned with the payment of bribes by
business enterprises and not a broader program to combat all forms of official
corruption. The bribery proscription only reaches the conduct of the offeror,
"active bribery," and not the foreign public official's receipt, "passive bribery. 8 7
The Convention defines bribery at the outset, in paragraph 1 of Article 1:
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any
person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue
83. George et al., supra note 18, at 35.
84. See id. at 34-39 (One of the most serious impediments to the negotiations was the
tax treatment of payments to foreign officials to obtain business. Germany and France
permitted businesses to deduct such payments, and it took years before those nations and
others finally agreed to prohibit the tax deductability of bribes paid to foreigners.)
85. The five non-members of the OECD to sign the Convention are Argentina,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic.
86. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105366 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-3, 78ff (2000)) (The amendments entailed an
expansion of the scope of the FCPA to cover "any person" who engages in transnational
bribery and other minor changes.); see also H.R. REP. 105-802, at 21 (1998). The OECD
Convention incorporates the core definition of bribery in the FCPA, and did not require any
substantial changes in United States law. See George & Lacey, supra note 46, at 571
("Congress easily set about the task of making a few necessary additions to the 1988 FCPA
Act" to conform United States law to the requirements of the OECD Convention.).
87. Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Officials in
International Business Transactions, OECD Negotiating Conf.
1, available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/ [hereinafter OECD Convention Commentaries].

Public Corruption

pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or
for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from
acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order
improper advantage in the
to obtain or retain business or other
88
conduct of international business.
Similar to the IACAC, the definition of bribery requires a link--"in order
that-- between the payment and the performance or omission of the official act.
The definition of "act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
official duties" goes a step beyond the standard approach to describing the crime
of bribery that paragraph 1 appears to adopt. Paragraph 4.c states that the crime
includes "any use of the public official's position, whether or not within the
official's authorised competence." s9 Although described as a form of bribery, this
offense is closer to the crime of influence-peddling in Article XI(c) of the IACAC.
The Commentaries to the Convention state:
One case of bribery which has been contemplated under the
definition in paragraph 4.c is where an executive of a company
gives a bribe to a senior official of a government, in order that
this official use his office-though acting outside his
competence-to make another official award a contract to that
company.90
In every nation, leading governmental officials have considerable
influence with, or at least access to, other offices over which they have no direct
supervisory authority. A payment to an official to intervene in another office's
exercise of authority on behalf of the payer is structurally similar to a bribe,
9
except that the benefit does not flow directly to the official making the decision. 1
Because the person receiving the benefit appears corrupt for taking something to
which he is not entitled, and the payer receives the same result that would take
place if he paid a bribe to the official with authority, it is certainly symmetrical to
view this conduct as another form of bribery. Yet, it is not a bribe per se absent
the direct exchange-quidpro quo-between the payer and the receiving official
that results in an exercise of governmental authority. It is something more akin to
88. OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 1, T 1.
89. Id., arL 1,$ 4.c.
90. OECD Convention Commentaries,supra note 87, T 19.
91. If the intervening official served as a conduit, then this would be a traditional
bribe using a third party as the go-between in the transaction. The OECD Convention
makes those who aid in the completion of the bribe guilty of the crime, so the scenario

envisioned in Paragraph 4.c must be when the official actually making the decision does
not receive or share in the benefit paid by the enterprise seeking the business.
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the misuse of influence that is derived, at least in part, from the nature of the
political system and the status of the recipient of the payment.
Requesting the intercession of a government official with another office
or branch is not necessarily corrupt, and in some cases is an acceptable aspect of
the political system. Not every public official, especially one holding an elected
position, is a full-time government employee, and some may be permitted to
maintain outside businesses or professional practices. Even among those officials
whose sole responsibility is government service, the use of influence to affect
another office's decision is not necessarily improper. In the United States, is it
common practice for a Senator or Representative to intercede on behalf of an
individual constituent or a company with a significant economic presence in the
state or district.
This broader interpretation of the crime of bribery brings the OECD
Convention closer to Article VI(l)(c) of the IACAC on the misuse of public office
for an illicit personal gain. The payment received by the interceding official, i.e.
the improper gain, makes this use of authority corrupt. While the conduct may not
constitute a bribe in the traditional sense, it has all the hallmarks of a corrupt
transaction that involves an illicit transfer resulting in a questionable exercise of
governmental power. The OECD Convention, therefore, is not confined solely to
bribery involving a quid pro quo between the offeror and the government's
decision-maker. The Convention takes corruption a small step further by
incorporating the notion of misuse by an intermediary of the accouterments of
office; that is, the employment of one's influence and access to other parts of
government to realize a personal benefit. Even this expansion of the law in the
OECD Convention beyond the narrower confines of bribery is not completely
effective because it only reaches "foreign public officials," not influential
members of the private sector or political
party officers who may hold
9z
considerable sway over public officials.
92. The Commentaries to the Convention advance one circumstance in which a
political party official may be the recipient of a bribe that would trigger liability for the
enterprise making the offer. Paragraph 16 states:
In special circumstances, public authority may in fact be held by
persons (e.g., political party officials in single party states) not
formally designated as public officials. Such persons, through their
de facto performance of a public function, may, under the legal
principles of some countries, be considered to be foreign public
officials.
OECD Convention Commentaries,supra note 87, 16. This circumstance is relatively
narrow, however, because it is limited to single party states in which the distinction
between the government and party are non-existent.
The FCPA explicitly incorporates foreign political party officials in its bribery
prohibition. It provides:

PublicCorruption

The Convention drafters expressed one potentially significant limitation
on the definition of bribery in the OECD Convention, the reservation that the
criminal prohibitions should not apply to "small facilitation payments." 3 While
any payment apparently comes within the parameters of Article I's broad
proscription against providing "any undue pecuniary or other advantage" to an
official, the Commentaries state that "small facilitation payments" are not made
"to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage. '94 The Commentaries
do not describe what constitutes a small facilitation payment, and there is no
explanation why these payments are not bribes. The OECD justified its position
exempting such payments on the ground that "[o]ther countries can and should
address this corrosive phenomenon by such means as support for programmes of
good governance. However, criminalisation by other countries does not seem a
practical or effective complementary action."
The OECD's statement removing small facilitation payments from the
coverage of the Convention appears to be at least a tacit acknowledgment that
adhering to a strict definition of bribery creates problems in getting some
countries to ratify the agreement if it meant eliminating all payments to public
officials, especially those at the lower levels of a bureaucracy. The FCPA
contains a detailed provision that excludes payments for "routine governmental
action," defined as a limited range of ministerial acts unrelated to obtaining
It shall be unlawful for any issuer which has a class of securities
registered ... or which is required to file reports .... or for any
officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder
thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of
the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or
authorization of the giving of anything of value to
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for
foreign political office for purposes of
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or
candidate in its or his official capacity, (ii) inducing such party,
official, or candidate to do or omit to do an act in violation of the
laNul duty of such party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing any
improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his
influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to
affect or influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(2) (2000).
93. OECD Convention Commentaries, supra note 87, 9.
94. IdL
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business or a contract. 95 Unlike the FCPA's more particularized treatment of the
issue, however, the OECD Convention takes a backhanded approach to these
payments by burying the limitation in the Commentaries, rather than placing it in
the substantive provisions of the Convention.
The OECD's approach creates a potentially significant gap in the
coverage of domestic laws adopted pursuant to the Convention because it provides
neither a definition of "facilitation payment" nor an explanation of when a
payment is small enough to avoid the criminal proscription. For example, it is not
clear whether the size of the transaction determines whether a payment is small or
not, or if the focus is solely on the value of the benefit. Moreover, it is not clear
whether the authority or rank of the official determines whether the payment is
given to "facilitate" the transaction when it would otherwise constitute an
impermissible bribe.
The OECD made no effort to explain why petty corruption is acceptable,
a position that can hardly be squared with the lofty rhetoric of the Convention's
Preamble that decries the distortion of international competitive conditions caused
by bribery. 96 Moreover, toleration of "small" facilitation payments contradicts
another statement in the Commentaries that bribery is an offence "irrespective of.
perceptions of local custom, the tolerance of such payments by local authorities,
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (2000). The FCPA defines routine governmental actions
as:
(3)(A) The term "routine governmental action" means only an action
which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify
a person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or
scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or
inspections related to transit of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and
unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities
from deterioration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.
(B) The term "routine governmental action" does not, include any
decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award
new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any
action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-making
process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue
business with a particular party.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(A)-(B) (2000). The IACAC does not provide a similar exemption
for either form of payment in its provision prohibiting transnational bribery. IACAC, supra
note 8, art. VIII.
96. OECD Convention, supra note 10, Preamble.
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or the alleged necessity of the payment in order to obtain or retain business or
other improper advantage." 97 Exempting certain types of payments makes the
scope of the law unclear and may afford corrupt officials a sizeable loophole to
avoid criminal liability.
C. The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
European Union members have undertaken two related efforts to address
corruption. 98 In 1997, the European Union adopted the Convention on the Fight
Against Corruption that required the member states to adopt laws punishing
bribery that involved officials of both the national governments and the European
Union, including its related bodies. Two years later, in 1999, the Council of
Europe, which is comprised of 41 nations, adopted the broader Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption, calling upon the members of the European Union to
adopt domestic legislation reaching all forms of corruption.P Thirty-six members
of the European Union and three non-members, including the United States, have
signed the Convention, and ten have ratified it.100 The Council Convention
reaches payments to domestic and foreign officials, members of international
0
organizations and parliamentary bodies, and employees of private enterprises.' '
The Council Convention prohibits both active and passive bribery,10 2 i.e.
the offeror and recipient of the payment may be prosecuted. It defimes active
bribery of public officials as "the promising, offering or giving by any person,
directly or indirectly, of any undue advantage" for an official "to act or refrain
from acting in the exercise of his or her functions."'1 3 Passive bribery is "the
97. OECD Convention Commentaries,supra note 87, T7.

98. The Council 6f Europe adopted the Convention on the Protection of the European
Communities' Financial Interests on July 26, 1995, that required members of the European
Union to adopt legislation addressing fraud in relation to the expenditure of funds or the
receipt of revenue by the European Community itself rather than by the government of the

member states. While the criminal conduct involved, at least in most instances,
misappropriation by public officials, the Convention did not address broader anticorruption issues. In a Protocol to the Convention adopted in September 1996, the Council
adopted provisions addressing bribery, which formed the basis for the later Conventions
addressing corruption. Protocol to the Convention, 1996 OJ. (C 313) 2.

99. For a history of the development of the Council Convention, see Explanatory
Report, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption T 39 (1998) [hereinafter Council
Convention
Explanatory Report],
available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Reports/Htrnl/173.htm.
100. See Council Convention, supra note 12, art. 32(3) (The Convention requires
fourteen nations to ratify it to enter into force.).
101. Id, art.2.

102. Id. arts. 2, 3.
103. Id. The Council Convention has slightly different language on what constitutes a
the payment for a bribe, using the term "advantages" rather than "undue advantage" to
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request or receipt by any of its public officials, directly or indirectly, of any undue
advantage, for himself or for anyone else, or the acceptance of an offer or promise
of such an advantage ....,104
The Council Convention begins with the core crime of bribery, defining
it in terms of a quidpro quo that requires proof of an exchange of value for the
official's exercise of authority entrusted to him. The Convention inserts the term
"undue" before advantage because it is "something the recipient is not lawfully
entitled to accept or receive."'' 0 5 The criminal provision focuses on the validity of
the payment and not just whether the official received a benefit in the transaction.
An innovative aspect of the Council Convention is the variety of individuals
subject to the criminal prohibition, covering not only government officials at the
international and national levels but also extending to bribery in private
transactions, without regard to any misuse of public authority.
The Council Convention took a step beyond bribery by incorporating
explicitly the crime of "Trading in Influence," which it defined as:
[Intentionally] promising, giving or offering, directly or
indirectly, of any undue advantage to anyone who asserts or
confirms that he or she is able to exert an improper influence
over the decision-making of any person referred to in Articles
2, 4 to 6 and 9 to 11 in consideration thereof, whether the
undue advantage is for himself or herself or for anyone else, as
well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the
promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that
describe the illicit transaction. More importantly, the Council Convention requires that the
bribe be paid to have the official act "in breach of his official duties." The Council
Convention deliberately avoided requiring proof of a breach of official duty as an element
of the crime. See Council Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 99 ("Such an extra
element of 'breach of duty' was, however, not considered to be necessary for the purposes
of this Convention.").
104. Council Convention, supra note 12, art. 3. Article 7 deals with bribery in the
private sector, and contains an additional element for the offense that requires proof that the
bribe induce the employee to breach a duty owed to the employer. The Article provides:
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offenses under its domestic law,
when committed intentionally in the course of business activity, the
promising, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of any undue
advantage to any persons who direct or work for, in any capacity,
private sector entities, for themselves or for anyone else, for them to
act, or refrain from acting, in breach their duties.
The bribery provisions dealing with public officials do not require proof of a breach of
duty, only the offer and receipt of an undue advantage related to official conduct.
105. Council Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 99, $ 38.
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influence, whether or not the influence is exerted or whether
or not the supposed influence leads to the intended resultIcs
The crime is committed upon receipt of the payment, and is not contingent on the
success of the intervention. This provision is similar to Article X(c) of the
IACAC and the OECD Convention's interpretation of the scope of its bribery
provision to include payments to a government official to secure the official's
intervention with another office or branch of government in connection with a
decision 0 7
The goal of the Trading in Influence prohibition is laudable for trying to
reach misconduct by those "who are in the neighbourhood of power" to address a
type of "background corruption."' 03 The provision follows the bribery model by
requiring that the offer and receipt of the undue advantage be "in consideration of
106. Council Convention, supra note 12, art. 12. Professor Kofele-Kale criticized the
Council Convention because it takes an almost exclusively anti-bribery approach and does
not reach broader issues of corruption, especially by those at the highest levels of
government See Kofele-Kale, supra note 15, at 155. The Trading in Influence provision
of the Council Convention, while structurally similar to the bribery provisions, is broader
because it reaches beyond the narrower quid pro quo relationship. It remains tied to a
direct exchange, however, and does not reach gratuities or other forms of misuse of power
for personal gain.
107. The FCPA also contains a provision prohibiting payments to foreign public
officials to use their influence on behalf of the offeror:
(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such
money or thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly
or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign political party or
official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political office, for
purposes of
(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign
official, political party, party official, or candidate in his or its official
capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official, political party, party
official, or candidate to do or omit to do any act in violation of the
lawful duty of such foreign official, political party, party official, or
candidate, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party
official, or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act
or decision of such government or instrumentality ....
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (2000).
108. Council Convention Explanatory Report, supra note 99, T 64. (The Council
justified the provision on the ground that some of the members of the European Union did
not address this type of corruption.)
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that influence." While the miscreant official need not be successful in wielding
influence, the illicit transaction between the offeror and the corrupt official must
take place before the exercise of influence. The Council Convention did not take
into account gratuities paid after the fact, even though such benefits may be at
least as corrupt when an official accepts a reward for past conduct, especially
when the payment may indirectly result in future uses of influence on the payer's
behalf. Absent proof of a promise to provide the undue advantage in exchange for
the use of influence, i.e. a quidpro quo, the Council Convention only reached the
most blatant misuse of influence, when an official sells himself to help secure a
particular outcome.
Like the OECD Convention, the Trading in Influence prohibition treads a
very thin line between corruption and acceptable interaction in public
administration. The Council Convention's Explanatory Report acknowledges that
"'Improper influence' must contain a corrupt intent by the influence peddler:
acknowledged forms of lobbying do not fall under this notion."' 9 While the
Convention focuses on the official's "corrupt intent" as the key to distinguishing
between legal and illegal participation in a decision, that term is not discussed in
either the Convention or its Explanatory Report, and there are no examples
provided as guidance for the application of this criminal prohibition.
As with any type of corruption offense, the proof of influence peddling
will be largely circumstantial, so that it will often be difficult to determine ex ante
when an official's use of influence to affect a decision is "improper" and when it
constitutes an acceptable form of lobbying. Different offices within one branch of
government are not sealed off from one another, and many political systems
incorporate, or at least accept, a degree of interaction between different branches
of government. For example, nations with a parliamentary system have elected
members of the legislative branch to serve as heads of departments, ostensibly
overseeing the actions of the bureaucrats working at the operational level."10 A
member may serve in different ministries during a legislative career and would
likely have a measure of influence in those departments. Similarly, in the United
States, the committee system in Congress gives individual members influence
with departments that they deal with regularly, and interceding with an executive
department on behalf of a constituent is not only acceptable but an expected
function of legislative office.'
109. Id. 65.
110. See, e.g., Colin Turpin, Ministerial Responsibility: Myth or Reality?, in THE
CHANGING CONSTITUTION 53, 62 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 1989) ("In the
British parliamentary democracy . . . [t]he accepted constitutional position is that the
minister at the head of a department ... has entire responsibility to Parliament for the
department's functions, including any parts of its work for which the immediate, 'day-today' responsibility is entrusted to subordinate ministers.").
111. See Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 813 ("Now it is well known that American
legislators at all levels see it as one of their primary functions to intercede [on] behalf of
constituents in their dealings with executive agencies of the government.").
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The Trading in Influence provision makes it a crime only when the
influence exerted or offered is "improper," a very imprecise term to define
criminal conduct. Determining what is improper under the provision could bog
down in an effort to prove what constitutes a common practice in the use of
influence to affect decisions. It may be impossible to distinguish acceptable
interaction between governmental officials from an impermissible use of
influence, especially for those at the highest levels of government who are likely
to have the type of influence that the Council Convention envisions. Instead,
proof of the crime will depend on the propriety and circumstances surrounding the
benefit conferred on the official. The corruption is not so much the official's offer
to influence another part of the government, which may not be clearly improper,
but the receipt of the benefit in relation to the official's use of influence on
another office or branch of government.
The transfer involved in influence-peddling is similar to the payment of a
bribe because the payer seeks to alter the exercise of authority through a secret
payment to a public official. There is no quid pro quo, however, because the
corrupt official does not have the authority to make the decision but only offers
his services to intervene in the decision-making process and may not be able to
secure the result sought. Compared to a bribery prosecution, the chance of
proving this type of corruption may be lower because the influence-peddler is
removed from the actual decision, so it will be difficult to link an improper
payment to a particular governmental action. The lack of a direct connection
means that the offeror and the influential official may more plausibly deny their
corrupt intent, and the possibility of detection, absent a cooperating witness, is
even less when the official's involvement is outside his own area of authority.
The operating assumption for this crime is that offerors will approach those with
the appearance of influence, and the only way an official can "sell" influence is to
have otherwise legitimate connections to the locus of authority. The stronger the
official's connection to another department, the easier it may be to deny any
impropriety. Indeed, the official may assert that he was looking out for-perhaps
even promoting-the interests of the affected office and the citizenry, not that he
sought to corrupt the process. The ability of the official to explain the use of
influence will require that any personal benefits received be subject to an innocent
explanation.
D. The Definition of Corruption in the International Conventions
The International Conventions use bribery as the core act of corruption.
Each requires proof of a relationship between the payment or transfer of the
benefit to the public official and the governmental action, phrasing the element as
an "exchange" in the IACAC, "in order to obtain or retain business" in the OECD
Convention, and for the official "to act or refrain from acting" in the Council
Convention. The Conventions all use the term "advantage" to describe the
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currency of the corrupt transaction, adopting a broad approach to the types of
benefits that one can offer an official to induce an improper exercise of power.
The OECD Convention is the only one to acknowledge explicitly a limitation on
what can constitute a bribe by exempting "small facilitation payments" from the
offense." 12
The bribery proscriptions in the IACAC and Council Convention reach
both the offer of the benefit-active bribery-and the receipt or solicitation of the
benefit-passive bribery. The focus of the OECD Convention is on the payment
of bribes by a domestic enterprise and not on the prosecution of the foreign
corrupt official, who presumably is subject to laws in his own nation prohibiting
receipt of the payment. The language of all three provisions requires that a quid
pro quo arrangement be concluded before the official action would occur,
although the bribe need not be actually paid or the exercise of authority completed
to violate the proscription. The Conventions do not address directly whether a
gratuity paid to reward an official for action already taken is a crime, even when
that exchange is intended as an illicit benefit to an official for a prior exercise of
authority.
The Conventions then identify conduct outside the traditional crime of
bribery that will be subject to criminal prosecution as a form of corruption. The
IACAC identifies these additional layers of corruption in Articles VI(1)(c) and XI
by making it a crime for an official to misuse his position to benefit himself or
others. Further, the IACAC recommends the crime of Illicit Enrichment as a form
of a catch-all provision that places the burden on the official to explain an
aggregation of wealth beyond that which would be expected of a public officer,
creating an inference of corruption." 3 These broader forms of corruption focus on
an official's misappropriation of a benefit to which the person was not otherwise
entitled. There need not be another participant in the illegal act, as is the case with
a bribe, and the decision or governmental action is not necessarily questionable or
tainted, although it often will be. This approach is similar to what Professor Key
called "auto-corruption" through the misuse of power to benefit a particular
person or group without the administrative process necessarily being degraded.' 14
The OECD and Council Conventions also expand the definition of corruption,
although not as broadly as the IACAC, to incorporate influence-peddling. Unlike
the IACAC's broader types of corruption, influence-peddling is structurally
similar to bribery because it involves an outsider seeking to affect the exercise of
government authority through an exchange with a public official to intercede in
the decision-making process.
While each treats the sale of influence, none of the Conventions deals
with the issue of gratuities, which are payments designed to gain access to an
official and perhaps a favorable hearing when an issue arises at a future date.
112. See OECD Convention Commentaries,supra note 87, 9.
113. See supra, text at notes 76-77.
114. See Key, supra note 36, at 48.
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Influence buying can be just as corrupt because it creates the appearance-and
often the reality-that the decision-making process is affected by the receipt of
gifts. It is not clear why the Conventions do not explicitly treat the purchaseof
influence outside the quidpro quo exchange as a form of corruption.
The creation of crimes beyond bribery raises a number of interesting
questions about the potential scope of the laws. Influence-peddling resembles the
bribery paradigm of corruption, but the structural similarity alone cannot make it
corrupt because lobbying legislatures and executive branch offices is often an
accepted, if sometimes unseemly, practice in most political systems."15 An
official's receipt of money or other benefits from private sources that do business
with the government is often disturbing, yet when the transaction occurs in the
context of political fundraising, there is a substantial question whether the
payment is something that the criminal law should punish." 6 When the crime
focuses primarily on the receipt of personal benefits, apparently through the
exercise of governmental authority or personal influence, there are questions
regarding what constitutes a misuse of office and who is harmed by the official's
conduct if the decision is not necessarily inappropriate or improper.
The International Conventions encourage the adoption of new or broader
criminal provisions to reach corruption beyond bribery, but at this stage there are a
number of unresolved issues. In the next section, the Article reviews how the law
of public corruption in the United States developed, and discusses how it may be
relevant to understanding the international effort to develop a system of criminal
laws addressing corruption. One of the reasons for adopting the International
Conventions was to harmonize the law of corruption and develop a unified
approach to the issue.'17 The statutes and theories for prosecuting corruption
adopted by the United States can be useful for other nations as they develop
programs to investigate and prosecute official misconduct.
IV. CORRUPTION UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Like other forms of economic or social authority, public office is
susceptible to abuse in ways ranging from trifling to substantial. Examples of
public corruption at the highest levels of the U. S. government executive branch
include everything from seemingly inconsequential tokens-items worth
approximately $5,900 provided by an agricultural organization to an incoming
115. See Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 845 ("Political pressure, then, is not always
wrongful in itself.").
116. See id. at 850 (distinguishing transactions involving personal benefits for the
official from political benefits); see infra, text at notes 152-160 (discussing relationship of
bribery to campaign contributions).
117. See, e.g., IACAC, supra note 8, Preamble 6 ("RECOGNIZING that, in some
cases, corruption has international dimensions, which requires coordinated action by States
to fight it effectively[.]").
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Secretary of Agriculture' '8-to systematic abuses of power, such as the conduct of
President Nixon and his aides in the Watergate scandal. There is an omnipresent
potential for misconduct resulting in personal gain or misuse of resources by those
holding public power that cuts across all levels of government authority, from the
highest federal and state executives to the customs agent at the border or the cop
on the beat.
Public corruption can be a form of larceny in the sense that the official is
enriched by the misconduct. But unlike common thievery, corruption is more than
simply the personal enrichment of the wrongdoer who takes something of value
from an identifiable victim. There is another, perhaps greater harm from
corruption: the violation of the public trust that results in a denigration of
society. 19 Not all abuses of office, however, are necessarily criminal offenses,
and even many acts that might fit within a broad anti-corruption statute may be so
trivial that they are not prosecuted with any degree of regularity.
In the drafting and ratification of the IACAC, the United States
maintained that it did not need to change or add provisions concerning corruption
because "the kinds of official corruption which are intended under the Convention
to be criminalized would in fact be criminal offenses under U.S. law."'"2 The
principle bribery provision applicable to federal employees is 18 U.S.C. Section
201, although a second statute reaches corruption at the state and local levels., 2
These two provisions target the types of two-party transactions reached in the
International Conventions. In addition to these explicit anti-corruption provisions,
federal law prohibits extortion "under color of official right" in the Hobbs Act,
which permits prosecution of public officials who accept payments in relation to
the exercise of their official duties.' 22 The Mail Fraud statute makes it an offense
to engage in "any scheme or artifice to defraud" that includes the deprivation of
the right of honest services, thereby making it a crime for a public official or
private employee to misuse authority for personal gain. 123 This amalgam of
statutes uses different terminology than the International Conventions to define
118. See United States v. Sun Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 401 (1999) (trade
association charged with providing former Secretary of Agriculture Espy with gratuities of
"tickets to the 1993 U.S. Open Tennis Tournament (worth $2,295), luggage ($2,427), meals
($665), and a framed print and crystal bowl ($524).").
119. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, For God, For Country, or ForMe?, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 1479, 1483 (1986) (arguing for a "stewardship" analysis of the harm caused by
bribes, that "the prohibition of bribery serves the purpose of protecting persons who are
affected by but are not parties to the reciprocal arrangements declared corrupt. The
stewardship paradigm thus focuses attention on what the interests of the beneficiaries arc
and what set of ethical or legal obligations imposed on the stewards will best serve those
interests in the long run.").
120. 146 CONG. REC. S7809 (2000).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). (The statute applies to officials working in programs
that receive over $10,000 of federal funds in a 12-month period.)
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2000).
123. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (wire fraud), and 1346 (2000).
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the crime of corruption, and the application of the laws to specific types of
misconduct is not always clear. To the extent United States law can serve as a
guide for other countries developing domestic legislation to prohibit corruption, a
review of the scope and application of the federal law can be informative.
A. Bribery and Gratuities
1. The Development of the Federal Law
Bribery of customs officers and judges was among the first federal
criminal statutes Congress enacted after the ratification of the Constitution. The
customs provision required that the official "connive at a false entry of' a ship or
goods, 24 while the judicial bribery law prohibited payments "to obtain or
procure" a decision from the court. 12 The judicial bribery provision clearly
required a quid pro quo between the offeror and the judge. The customs statute
used the term "connive' to describe the relationship between the offeror and the
officer in relation to the misuse of authority. Conniving incorporates the notion of
a surreptitious arrangement, so that the exchange is similar to the quid pro quo
requirement for a bribe.
Congress adopted a broader bribery statute in 1853, maling it a crime to
offer or give a thing of value to any federal officer "with intent to influence his
vote or decision!' on an official action.126 This provision made proof of the quid
pro quo an explicit element of the crime. In 1863, Congress expanded the
criminal lav of corruption by passing the first statute prohibiting gratuities to
customs officers from any person "engaged in the importation of goods, wares or
merchandise" into the United States.127 Unlike the earlier bribery provisions, this
crime did not require that the payment be in exchange for the avoidance of
customs duties but instead criminalized the payment
because of its potential
2
impact on the future conduct of customs officers. 8
Congress streamlined and reorganized the federal bribery and conflict of
interest laws in 1962129 into "a single comprehensive section of the Criminal Code
for a number of existing statutes concerned with bribery."I' 3G The bribery
provision is Section 201(b), and it reaches both active bribery (the offeror of the
124. Act of July 30, 1789, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 46 (1789).
125. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 117 (1790).
126. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 171 (1853). The provision was part of

the Act to Prevent Frauds on the Treasury. See Dixon v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 491
n.8 (1984) (discussing history of the federal bribery laws).
127. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 76, § 6, 12 Stat. 740 (1863).
128. Id.
129. Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 201
(2000)).
130. S. REP. NO. 87-2213, at 1 (1962), reprintedin 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3853.
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bribe) and passive bribery (the official receiving "any thing of value")., 31 The
federal bribery provision is almost identical to the core bribery offense defined in
the International Conventions that obliges the government to establish a quidpro
quo arrangement for a conviction.1 32 Section 201(b) requires the government to
prove that the offeror transmitted the payment with the intent to "influence any
official act" and that the public official "corruptly demands, seeks, receives, or
agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or
entity in return for. . being influenced" in the exercise of authority. 133 Section
201 broadly defines "official act" as any issue currently before the official for a
decision or action, or "which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be
brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such
official's place of trust or profit."'134 Those subject to the criminal prohibition
include every federal employee, members of Congress, and those who have been

131. 18 U.S.C § 201(b) (2000).
132. See United States v. Sun Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404-405 (1999) ("for
bribery there must be a quid pro quo-a specific intent to give or receive something of
value in exchange for an official act."); Brown, supra note 30, at 2060 ("Subsection (b) is a
classic bribery statute.").
In 1984, Congress extended the federal bribery prohibition to state and local officials
when the program employing the official receives at least $10,000 of federal money in a
twelve-month period. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000). The statute reaches any person who
"corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person, with intent to
influence or reward an agent" of the governmental organization in connection with any
business or transactions having a value of $5,000 or more. Id. at § 666(a)(2). The language
tracks § 201(b)'s requirement that the payment be to influence a decision, although §
666(a)(2) includes "reward," a term not in § 201(b). Although it is not entirely clear
whether use of the term "reward" means that § 666(a)(2) also prohibits gratuities, the better
interpretation is that the provision only reaches bribes. The original language of § 666
covered transfers "for or because of' governmental business, which parallels the gratuities
provision in § 201(c). In 1986, Congress amended § 666 by, inter alia, changing the
language to § 201(b)'s "influence" requirement. Pub. L. No. 99-646. In United States v.
Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit analyzed § 666(a)(2) and the
legislative history, finding that the better position is that it parallels the bribery prohibition
of § 201(b) but does not encompass gratuities. Id. at 1015 n.4; but see United States v.
Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 171 (2nd Cir. 1995) (§ 666 prohibits both bribes and gratuities); see
also George D. Brown, Stealth Statute-Corruption,the Spending Power, and the Rise of

18 U.S.C. § 666, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 247, 310 (1998) ("The change from 'for' [sic]
or 'because of to 'corruptly influencing' is a change from a gratuities to a bribery
statute.").
133. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
134. Id. § 201(a)(3) ("the term 'official act' means any decision or action on any
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending,
or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official
capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit").
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"selected to
be a public official" even though they have not yet assumed public
35
authority.
In addition to the bribery provision, the federal statute prohibits the offer
and receipt of any thing of value that is provided "for or because of any official
act performed or to be performed" by a public official. 136 The gratuity provision,
Section 201(c), is part of the bribery statute, but it expands the scope of the anticorruption law. 137 Section 201(c) reaches a broader form of public corruption by
prohibiting the offer and receipt of an item related to the performance of a public
duty even though the official act is not conditioned on the payment. Unlike a
bribe, which can only occur before an official act, because the crime is the quid
pro quo arrangement to influence the outcome, a gratuity can be either before or
after the official act because the crime is providing the reward regardless of when
already reached, but
the act occurred. One cannot bribe an official for a decision
38
one can certainly reward an official for previous conduct
While a gratuity is structurally similar to a bribe (a transfer to a public
official related to the exercise of governmental authority) the criminal prohibition
reaches payments that are not as closely connected to the outcome of the
governmental process. While the bribe involves a quidpro quo arrangement, the
purpose of a gratuity is to gain favor from an official because that official has the
authority to take action affecting the offeror at some future time. The government
135. Id. § 201(a)(1)-(2):
(1) the term "public official" means Member of Congress, Delegate,
or Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has
qualified, or an officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf
of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of
Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any
official function, under or by authority of any such department,
agency, or branch of Government, or ajuror,
(2) the term "person who has been selected to be a public official"
means any person who has been nominated or appointed to be a
public official, or has been officially informed that such person will
be so nominated or appointed.
136. Id. § 201(c).
137. In addition to the bribery and gratuities prohibition in § 201, Congress adopted
other prohibitions on federal employees related to receipt of salary supplements, 18 U.S.C.
§ 209 (2000), and restrictions on representing parties in claims against the government. IS
U.S.C. § 205 (2000). These narrower provisions target particular abuses that would not
come within the prohibition of § 201.
138. See United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated on
other grounds by 240 F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sections 201(b) and 201(c) "differ in their
temporal focus. Bribery is entirely future-oriented, while gratuities can be either forward or
backward looking.").
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is in a constant process of making policy and regulating industries, and a gratuity
can help the offeror gain access to the official at a later time when an important
issue moves to the forefront. A decision tainted by bribery is questionable in
almost every circumstance, but a reward to an official, even if it were judged
improper, does not mean any particular decision was wrong or otherwise affected
by the official's self-enrichment.
An issue that has arisen in the interpretation of the gratuity prohibition in
Section 201(c) is how closely linked the governmental act and the transfer to the
official must be to establish a criminal violation. In other words, how is a gratuity
different from a bribe? The bribery provision requires a payment to "influence
any official act," so the government must prove that the offeror sought a particular
result through the payment, and that the government official accepted the payment
to reach the requested outcome. The illegal gratuity provision requires that the
gift be "for or because of' the official's exercise of authority, but the transfer need
not affect that decision. If the payment is a reward for a previous decision, then
the distinction between a bribe and a gratuity is clear. While one cannot offer a
bribe after the fact, the gift to an official who made a decision favorable to the
offeror is rewarded "for or because of' the decision. This is structurally similar to
the quidpro quo of the bribe, but in a different temporal situation that removes the
activity from the crime of bribery. 39 The criminal prohibition on after the fact
gratuities addresses payments that are improper because the public official realizes
a personal gain from the exercise of authority, while the offeror builds goodwill
that may provide access to the official when a decision that may affect the offeror
arises in the future.
Making after-the-fact gratuities illegal under Section 201(c) means that
the payments are not viewed as isolated events. An after-the-fact gift may in
reality be the precursor to bribery because the first payment is unlikely to be the
last contact between the offeror and the official. 40 Once rewarded, an official
may be likely to accommodate the offeror's subsequent requests for meetings and
support for a position favorable to the offeror. Proof of the link between the
gratuity and the previously made decision is sufficient to label the transfer as
corrupt and therefore worthy of the criminal prohibition because it may be a
precursor to future payments that would constitute bribes. The problem in a
139. The timing of the actual payment of a bribe is irrelevant because it is the quidpro
quo arrangement that constitutes the offense. There is no requirement that either the
payment be made before the decision or that the official exercise the authority consistent
with the arrangement. See United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 850 (1982) ("[l]t is no
defense that the promise could not have been carried out either because the official act to be
taken was beyond the defendant's authority (citations omitted), or had already been taken..
. Neither is it a defense that the public official will not be called upon to take official action
because of the fictitious nature of the person alleged to be seeking assistance.").
140. See Windsor & Getz, supra note 44, at 750 ("Gifts and gratuities are different in
principle from full-blown corruption; however, their customary practice and expectation
could become the basis for corruption.").
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prosecution for this type of Section 201(c) violation will be establishing the
relationship between the gift and the official conduct; that the item conferred was
"for or because of' an exercise of authority. A gift may be given for different
reasons, some altruistic and others corrupt, so proving that the motivation for
giving and taking the gift was related specifically to the official's prior decision
may be impossible,
absent an admission of culpability by one of the parties to the
141
transaction.
Section 201(c) also prohibits gifts given for official acts "to be
performed," which raises a thornier issue of distinguishing a gratuity from a bribe
when the sequence of payment and official act are the same for both crimes. One
could view the gratuity provision as a less culpable subset of bribery, that absent
proof of the quid pro quo arrangement the government need only show some
general connection between the transfer of the item and the official act. Section
201(c) provides for a lower penalty for an illegal gratuity (up to two years
imprisonment) while a bribery conviction under Section 201(b) may be punished
by up to fifteen years imprisonment. 142 Yet, the gratuity provision may reach
farther than bribery by prohibiting gifts made to curry favor with an official for a
later, as yet unidentified decision. Unlike a bribe, which is an exchange for a
particular result, the gratuity can be a form of influence buying by the offeror,
designed to gain access to an official and perhaps a favorable disposition in future
exercises of authority. The proffer of meals, travel and other benefits by lobbyists
to legislators are examples of gifts that, while not necessarily linked to a specific
piece of legislation, are designed to affect-perhaps even to influence-decisions
on proposals that may not exist at the time of the gratuity, but that the lobbyist
knows may arise one day and affect the lobbyist's clients.

2. Sun Diamond:Distinauishing Bribes from Before the Fact Gratuities
In United States v. Sun Diamond Growers, 43 the Supreme Court dealt
with the question of whether gifts designed to curry favor well before any specific
issue is in front of the official receiving the benefits constitute illegal gratuities.
The defendant was an agricultural trade group that provided a number of gifts,
with a total value of approximately $5,900, to Mike Espy after his nomination to
141. The bribery and gratuity provisions in § 201 actually incorporate two separate
crimes each, one by the offeror and one by the recipient. It may be that the government
will only have sufficient proof of one party's intent while the other party may be found not
guilty. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The payment
and the receipt of a bribe are not interdependent offenses, for obviously the donor's intent
may differ completely from the donees. Thus the donor may be convicted of giving a bribe
despite the fact that the recipient had no intention of altering his official activities, or even
lacked the power to do so.").
142. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
143. 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
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be the Secretary of Agriculture. The case arose as part of an Independent Counsel
investigation of Espy, and the indictment alleged that there were two agricultural
matters of interest to the defendant that motivated the gifts as a means to gain
favor with the Secretary. 44 The government did not, however, assert that the gifts
were specifically related to these matters; instead, the government's theory was
that the gifts were provided because of Espy's position as Secretary of
Agriculture, i.e. to curry favor with an official wielding substantial authority over
the defendant's business.14 5 The Independent Counsel's approach to Section
201(c) was that the defendant engaged in influence buying through the gifts
provided to Espy-to build a reservoir of goodwill146-- but did not seek a decision
on a particular matter pending before the Secretary.
The Court rejected the government's theory that Section 201 (c) prohibits
gifts designed solely to gain favor with the recipient, without proof of a nexus
between the gift and a particular future decision of the official. The opinion began
by distinguishing a bribe from a gratuity, at least where the gift occurs prior to any
particular decision, by noting that a bribe requires proof of a quidpro quo while a
gratuity "may constitute merely a reward for some future act that the public
official will take ... .,,147 The Court held that Section 201(c)'s language that the
gift be "for or because of any official act" required the government to prove the
defendant gave the gift in connection with a specific issue that would come before
the official at some point in time for a decision. 148 Otherwise, the broad reading
proposed by the government "would criminalize, for example, token gifts to the
President based on his official position and not linked to any identifiable actsuch as the replica jerseys given by championship sports teams each year during
ceremonial White House visits .... ,,149
Sun Diamond was not a wholesale rejection of the criminalization of
gratuities, but the Court spurned what it called the government's "meat axe"
144. Id. at 402. (The first matter related to regulatory changes in a grant program to
defray foreign marketing expenses that might result in lower payments unless the Secretary
of Agriculture adopted a definition favorable to the defendant, and the second involved
regulation of a pesticide that the Secretary could affect by interceding with the
Environmental Protection Agency.).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 404 (The government sought to convict under the "illegal gratuity" theory.).
147. Id at 405.
148. Id. at 406. The Court analogized the "for or because of" element of the gratuity
offense to asking the question, "Do you like any composer?" According to the Court, that
question "normally means 'Do you like some particular composer?'," so that the reference
to an official act in the gratuity provision, broadly defined in § 201(a)(3), means that
Congress must have meant that the gift be linked to a specific act just as the question is
really asking about a particular composer. Id. The Court's analysis would apply to an
official charged under § 201 (c) with receipt of a gratuity, requiring that the defendant know
that it was a reward "for or because of" a pending official act and not simply a generalized
benefit conferred on the official.
149. Sun Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406-407.
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approach to before the fact gifts because such treatment would undermine the
extensive administrative regulation of gifts to federal officials.so
These
regulations, which are quite detailed, were adopted to ensure a high level of ethics
when officials interact with private parties, especially those subject to the
official's authority. 5 ' The criminal statutes "are merely the tip of the regulatory
iceberg," and a broad analysis of Section 201(c) that would reach every gift from
a person with any potential interest in the future exercise of governmental
authority would make the administrative scheme superfluous.' -2 Perhaps worse,
according to the Court, this approach could subject anyone giving and receiving
an item of value that could be connected to any potential official act subject to the
unreviewable
prosecutorial discretion about who to charge with a criminal
153
offense.
While the Court's analysis of the criminal prohibition on gratuities given
before an official act reflects a plausible reading of the statutory language, there is
a troubling aspect to the opinion's narrow approach that acquiesces in before-thefact gifts made to curry favor with officials. By requiring the government to
establish a clear link between the gift and a pending decision, the Court essentially
eliminated the criminal prohibition on gratuities when the transfer takes place
before an official act. 54 If the government can establish that the gift is related to a
specific matter, then it most likely has proven a bribe because the transfer would
be designed to affect the official action, demonstrating a quid pro quo. It is
difficult to see how providing any thing of value would be "for or because of any
150. Id. at 412.
151. For example, regulations permit federal officials to accept gifts worth S20 or less,
so long as the total amount of gifts from that source is less than S50 per year. 5 C.F.R. §
2635.204(a) (2001). The Court noted that there were numerous similar regulations
"littering this field" and that the broad interpretation of § 201(c) could "expand this one
piece of the regulatory puzzle so dramatically as to make many other pieces misfits." Sun
Diamond, 526 U.S. at 412.
152. Sun Diamond,526 U.S. at 410.
153. The Court was troubled by the government's statement at the oral argument of
the case that a free lunch provided to the Secretary of Agriculture in conjunction with a
speech to a farm organization would be a criminal violation because the Secretary could
have a matter affecting farmers at some point in time. Id. at 407. The Court expressed
concerned with interpreting the statute in a way that would make even the most innocuous
gift a potential crime, regardless of whether it may be corrupt, and refused to rely on the
reasonable exercise of prosecutorial discretion as the sole protection for what appeared to
be innocent conduct. Id. at 408.
154. See George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us - Salinas, Sun-Diamond.
and Two Views of the AnticorruptionModel, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747, 774 (2000) ("The Court
[in Sun Diamond] has essentially eliminated the separate crime of unlawful gratuity and
turned it into a lesser included offense of bribery."). Although Professor Brown asserts that
Sun Diamondis a "decriminalization of the gratuities offense,' that is only true insofar as a
before the fact gratuity is concerned. Id. A reward "for or because of" a decision already
made remains a violation of § 201(c), while that payment could not be a bribe. Id.
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official act," a Section 201(c) gratuities violation, if the transfer was not also
intended to "influence" the decision, a Section 201(b) bribery violation.' Gifts
to public officials are given for a reason, and when the motive is related to the
authority vested in the official rather than a personal relationship, then the gift is
designed either to affect the outcome of a particular decision-making process or
more generally to gain access and curry favor to affect a future decision. If there
is no evidence of a pending official act to which the payment relates, then the
government cannot establish either an illegal gratuity-there is no56link to prove
the gift is "for or because of' the exercise of authority-or a bribe.1
As an anti-corruption measure, Section 201 reaches the core form of
corruption: bribery. The statute expands the criminal law to prohibit gifts
designed to reward an official, which could not be prosecuted as bribes because of
the absence of a quid pro quo. Sun Diamond, however, curtails the statute by
removing the possibility of criminal prosecution for before the fact influence
buying if no link exists between the transfer and a specific pending decision. The
decision creates a distinction between pre- and post-official action gratuities that
ignores the corrupting effect of any transmission of a benefit to a public official
motivated primarily by the authority conferred on that official. In either instance,
the primary reason for giving a gift is to establish conditions under which the
155. The Court mentions one possibility of an illegal gratuity concerning a pending
decision that can still be prosecuted after narrow interpretation of § 201(c). If a person
nominated for an office announced a position on a pending issue, the gratuity may be given
"for or because of' the nominee's anticipated decision. Sun Diamond, 526 U.S. at 408.
The Court's example is chimerical, for two reasons. First, as a practical matter, nominees
do not announce how they will decide a particular matter prior to their official appointment
to an office, and it may be improper-"arbitrary and capricious" in the language of
administrative law-to announce a decision before the person has reviewed the facts and
legal arguments. Indeed, the nominee is unlikely to have access to the relevant materials on
which to base a decision until the person assumes office. Second, the gratuity, if linked to
an announced position, is also designed to assure the nominee will maintain that position,
i.e. to influence the outcome of the decision-making process, which is a bribe in violation
of§ 201(b).
A § 201(c) charge in a case involving a pending decision, as opposed to an after the
fact gift, remains viable as a lesser-included offense of bribery. If the jury found that the
evidence of a quidpro quo were not sufficiently clear to establish that element beyond a
reasonable doubt, it is possible to return a verdict on the gratuity charge because the gift
need not be intended to influence, only that it was linked to a specific official act. A
number of courts have held that § 201(c) is a lesser-included offense of § 201(b). See, e.g.,
United States v. Patel, 32 F.3d 340, 343 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d
142, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1309 (2nd Cir. 1992),
but it is unlikely that a prosecutor would not charge bribery after Sun Diamond's analysis
for the nexus requirement for a gratuity violation.
156. See Charles B. Klein, What Exactly Is an Unlawful Gratuity After United States
v. Sun Diamond Growers?, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 116, 123 (1999) ("it is difficult, if not
impossible, to explain how a gift-giver who actually intends to influence a particular
official act can violate the unlawful gratuity statute, but not the bribery statute.").
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official will be favorably disposed to the offeror in future cases. The timing of the
gratuity is irrelevant when the offeror seeks future benefits from the transmission
of the gift. Sun Diamond's interpretation of the statute, however, insulates a gift
given sufficiently early in the decision-making process such that it cannot be
linked directly to a specific issue before the recipient. While the bribery provision
prohibits payments made to influence a particular decision, a gratuity may
purchase something akin to that influence with a similar corrupting effect on the
exercise of official authority. 157
The problem with an expansive view of Section 201(c)'s prohibition on
gratuities is determining how to measure the effect of a gift in order to ascertain
whether it was corrupt. The gratuity provision does not require proof of the
"corrupt" intent required for bribery, and Section 201(b)'s more narrowly drawn
elements mean that only egregious conduct will be punished. Once the criminal
law moves beyond the clearer bribery arrangement to the more amorphous crime
of illegal gratuities, the law may be used to punish any gift, including the types of
trivial items that concerned the Supreme Court in Sun Diamond. Given the
political nature of corruption charges, a criminal prohibition on gifts could be a
means to attack political foes. The criminal law employs broad terms to define a
violation, so fine distinctions between tokens of appreciation-the championship
jersey or free lunch-and improper efforts to buy influence will be difficult to
incorporate into even the most carefully drafted statute. The OECD encountered
the same problem in asserting an exemption for "small facilitation payments" that
would not be a violation of the OECD Convention's anti-bribery provisions. In
each instance, the difficulty is defining where the line can be dravn between a
trivial violation that should not be prosecuted, and one serious enough to invoke
the powerful force of the criminal law.
The Supreme Court's reference to the large body of administrative
regulations governing gifts to federal officials is instructive on how other nations
can approach the issue. It may be that the subtle ethical distinctions between
acceptable and questionable gifts should be left to a non-criminal or
administrative forum. Unlike broad criminal statutes, administrative guidelines
can address issues regarding the size of permissible gifts, what sources of gifts
would be objectionable, and the required reporting provisions to ensure
transparency in the exercise of authority. The non-criminal alternative, however,
assumes that there is a well-developed administrative structure for drafting and
enforcing such a code of conduct. To the extent that nations cannot rely on such a
mechanism to ensure that gifts are regulated, the criminal law may be the only
means available to regulate and prohibit gratuities designed to buy influence.

157. See Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 825 ("[S]tudents of power and influence have

observed that the most effective pressure may be that which evokes an anticipatory
response on the part of the pressured individual without even an explicit request on the part
of the person exercising the pressure, much less an explicit agreement.").
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3. Incorporating Gratuities Into an Anti-Corruption Statute
None of the International Conventions specifically address the issue of
unlawful gratuities, although it is possible that the bribery provisions' quid pro
quo requirement can be read broadly to include any transfer related to an official
act, perhaps reaching some before-the-fact gifts to officials. The bribery statute,
however, would not reach after-the-fact gifts, and the influence-peddling sections
of the IACAC and Council Convention incorporate the same quidpro quo element
of bribery so they would not cover gifts unrelated to a specific decision.
A criminal prohibition on gratuities has much to recommend it to nations
seeking to eliminate corruption because it creates a broader anti-corruption
offense targeting gifts to officials designed to affect the exercise of governmental
authority. 58 First, the prohibition fills a gap in the bribery statute by reaching
after the fact gratuities so that arrangements that might avoid the quid pro quo
element are still subject to prosecution. Second, the practice of providing gifts to
government officials because of their position has the same potential as the offer
of a bribe to corrupt the governmental process, and certainly presents an
appearance of unfairness if access to an official is in any way dependent on
providing personal benefits. Third, prohibiting gifts provided because an official

158. In addition to the statutory prohibition on bribery and gratuities, federal law also
prohibits supplementation of the salaries of federal employees by private parties. 18 U.S.C.
§ 209 (2000). Section 209 provides:
(a) Whoever receives any salary, or any contribution to or
supplementation of salary, as compensation for his services as an
officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States
Government, of any independent agency of the United States, or of
the District of Columbia, from any source other than the Government
of the United States, except as may be contributed out of the treasury
of any State, county, or municipality;
or Whoever, whether an individual, partnership, association,
corporation, or other organization pays, or makes any contribution to,
or in any way supplements the salary of, any such officer or
employee under circumstances which would make its receipt a
violation of this subsectionShall be subject to the penalties set forth in section 216 of
this title.
This provision has been described by Professor Nolan as "the third tier in a hierarchy of
impermissible payments, which begins with bribes, then moves to illegal gratuities, and
ends with supplementation of salary." Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income:
Conflict and Control Limits on the Outside Income of Government Officials, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 57, 90 (1992).
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occupies an important government
post diminishes the effect of wealth on the
159
exercise of official authority.
The problem with a broad criminal prohibition on gifts is that there are
legitimate forms of lobbying or personal reciprocity that involve providing gifts or
other benefits to government officials.'6 Interaction between government
officials and those subject to their authority can be quite beneficial by providing
an avenue for information to flow from the constituencies affected by government
decisions. Moreover, the ceremonial aspects of executive authority are powerful
symbolic tools, and gifts to an official from organizations can be a positive
expression of the relationship between a country's leaders and its citizens. There
is nothing corrupt about the tokens the Supreme Court described in Sum Diamond
as the types of gifts that could trigger criminal liability under a broad definition of
an unlawful gratuity. A blanket criminal prohibition on gifts may curtail
unnecessarily some beneficial interaction between government officials and those
interested in the policies administered because of fear of prosecution for any
minor transgression. The criminal law should not seek to make government more
remote from those governed.
The argument against a broad criminal prohibition on gifts may overstate
the case, however, because permitting gifts allows a pernicious form of corruption
to persist, giving the appearance that access to and influence with officials is
conditioned on the offer of favors and benefits. While there may be instances of
insignificant tokens of appreciation that should not be prohibited,
counterexamples exist that demonstrate the strong potential for corruption from
gratuities. For example, United States v. Sawyer' 61 catalogued a number of
benefits provided by lobbyists to Massachusetts state legislators, including golf
outings, lavish dinners, and a stay at a resort while attending a legislative
conference, as part of an effort to gain favor from elected representatives who
would consider legislation affecting the lobbyists' clients. 62 The purchase of
159. Cf.Brown, supra note 30, at 2057 ("I think that society should continue to
condemn the transfer of something of value to an official who is likely to perform official
acts that could benefit the giver, or who has performed such an act in the past.").
160. See Vincent R. Johnson, America's Preoccupationwith Ethics in Government, 30
ST. MARY'S LJ.717, 720 (1999) (Describing the Chinese tradition of guanxi that involve
"special connections and privileged relationships for the purpose of gaining an advantage
or accomplishing results" that is an acceptable practice even though, "[a]t its worst, guanxi
is akin to corruption and can amount to not following the rules:); Joongi Kim & Jong Bum
Kim, Cultural Differences in the Crusade Against International Bribery: Rice-Cake
Expenses in Korea andthe Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J 549,
561 (1997) (Describing the Korean tradition of providing ttokkap, which "literally means
rice-cake expenses and traces its origins to payments that were offere to cover for the
expenses for buying rice-cakes, a precious food source in earlier times.").
161. 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996).
162. Id. at 720-21. The defendant, a lobbyist for an insurance company, provided
these benefits to the chairpersons of the Insurance Committee of the Massachusetts House
of Representatives, and once the representatives left the committee they received
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access and influence on future decisions through gifts should not be constrained
solely by reliance on an official's moral fortitude to resist temptation.
The problem with gratuities is not that an individual or group offers a gift
as a means to gain access to government officials, but that the official receives a
benefit because of the authority the government confers on him. This is similar to
the definitions of corruption discussed earlier, that any misuse of office for
personal gain is corrupt. Crafting a criminal prohibition on gifts is difficult
because the law should not punish every benefit and there are advantages to
adopting rules that do not unnecessarily curtail interaction between officials and
those who they are charged with governing. 163 One approach is to narrow the
definition of the offices subject to a strict prohibition on receiving gifts, while
requiring a higher degree of proof to convict a lower-level official. Section 201
applies equally to career federal employees, appointed officers, and members of
Congress, and a better approach to prohibiting gratuities may be to calibrate the
prohibition to the recipient's office to avoid overcriminalization while also
preventing improper influence buying through gifts.164 While the Sun Diamond
Court justified its interpretation of the statute by pointing to trivial gifts as
potentially triggering criminal liability, a provision drafted more carefully than
Section 201(c) that created different prohibitions based on the recipient's level of
authority and the type of gift received would redress much of the concern with
overcriminalization.
For most federal employees, the stricter "for or because of any official
act" element contained in Section 201(c) works well because they are unlikely to
ever receive a gift, or at least not one of any particular value, related to their work.
Moreover, it is unlikely that anyone would try to curry favor with the vast
majority of government workers because they do not have the authority to set
policy or establish regulations outside of a very narrow area. In other words, there
is no need to buy influence with most workers because there is nothing much to
"practically nothing" from the defendant for entertainment. Id. at 721. Sawyer involved a
federal prosecution under, inter alia,the mail and wire fraud statute, not § 201, because the
officials were state representatives not covered by that provision, which only applies to
those at the federal level. The mail and wire fraud convictions were premised on the fact
that the defendant provided unlawful gratuities under state law, and the case is a good
example of the kinds of benefits that can be provided officials because of the governmental
authority vested in them.
163. There are detailed regulations, discussed in Sun Diamond, governing the source
and amount of permissible gifts for federal employees. For example, employees are
permitted to accept gifts of $20 or less "provided that the aggregate market value of
individual gifts received from any one person... shall not exceed $50 in a calendar year."
5 C.F.R. § 2635.204(a) (2001).
164. For example, all federal employees who leave the government are prohibited
from seeking to influence a decision on a matter in which the employee "participated
personally and substantially," 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000), and there is a one-year
restriction on certain high level executive and legislative branch employees from appearing
before the agency or office that employed them. 18 U.S.C. §§ 209(c)-(e) (2000).
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purchase. In the few instances in which a gift is given, it is likely to be a token
benefit for which it would be difficult to demonstrate a link between the gift and
the official act. The transfer of any valuable item to a lower-level employee is
arguably a bribe because that person likely exercises authority over a matter of
particular interest to the offeror. Therefore, the stricter prohibition on gratuities
serves as a lesser-included offense of bribery. For most government officials, it is
unlikely that a small gift would have any corrupting effect, so a narrower criminal
prohibition will not permit a substantial amount of corruption to go unpunished.165
Officials at the highest levels of government should be subject to a
stricter prohibition because there is a benefit to purchasing access to and influence
with those exercising significant authority.165 For these officials, the statute
should make any gift subject to criminal prosecution. Sim Diamond is a prime
example of an organization seeking to build ties to an incoming cabinet officer
who would have significant authority to affect the organization's interests. It is
difficult not to view the gratuities provided as anything but corrupt, regardless of
whether they constituted a criminal violation under Section 201(c). To the
argument advanced in Sun Diamond that a broad prohibition would reach even
trivial gifts, the better approach would be to bar even the modest token of
appreciation to ensure that the corrupting effect of valuable gifts is proscribed. A
team can donate a championship jersey to the government and it would not be a
gift to the President personally. The senior officials can politely refuse a meal or
offer to pay for it. An effective prohibition on gifts used as a means of buying
influence with officials should distinguish between the levels of authority
possessed. 67
There is another important distinction between types of officials for
establishing a clear law of public corruption involving gifts - whether the official
is elected or appointed. Most gratuity cases, such as Sim Diamond,have involved
165. Professor Nolan noted that lower-level federal employees are unlikely to receive
the types of benefits accorded higher officials:
[B]ecause senior officials are more powerful and more closely

identified with their public positions, they may have a greater
opportunity for improper private gain from their public offices. A
GS-1 1 staff member at the Internal Revenue Service is unlikely to be
offered paid speaking engagements on her favorite topic, auto racing,
as a pretext for supplementing her salary or merely to purchase
general access to her. On the other hand, the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue might be an attractive target for such offers.
Nolan, supra note 158, at 141.

166. Section 207(d) restricts senior executive branch personnel from having any

contact with their former departments for one year while imposing lesser restrictions on
mid-level and low-level employees. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)-(d) (2000).

167. See Brown, supra note 30, at 2057 ("It is crucial to distinguish between
acceptable and unacceptable forms of influence.").
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appointed officials in the government's executive branch. Because of the
enormous authority they wield, the receipt of any gift by those high level officials
raises legitimate questions regarding the propriety of the transfer. Elected
representatives, however, depend on gifts to conduct their election campaigns.
Any effort to adopt a criminal prohibition on gratuities must address the question
168
of how political campaign contributions fit within the anti-corruption regime.
B. Corruption and Campaign Contributions
In the United States, and some western-style democracies, campaigns for
public elective office are financed largely through private donations. Political
contributions usually are given in cash--or its equivalents-and many national
campaigns operate year-round and raise millions of dollars. Elected officials
wielding enormous power solicit these funds, and serious questions have been
raised regarding the propriety of large campaign contributions given to persuade
the recipient to view the contributor's position positively after the election, or at
least be willing to listen to the contributor's point of view. A decision by a
representative that favors donors or groups who provided campaign funds in the
past triggers questions regarding the propriety of the decision and its relation to
the campaign contributions. A recent example is the controversy regarding
pardons issued on the last day of President
Clinton's term and whether there was
169
any connection to political contributions.
Whenever large amounts of money reach a public official, there is the
temptation to divert the funds to personal use. Moreover, because solicitation of
contributions by candidates and monetary donations to political campaigns is
permissible, bribes and gratuities can be designated as campaign contributions to
camouflage the true nature of the payment. The recent allegations about a secret
political fund maintained by former Chancellor Kohl of Germany is an example of
the potential for serious corruption in a political system dependant, at least in part,
on private monetary contributions to fund campaigns for office. 170 Yet, even if
168. See Lowenstein, supra note 32, at 809 ("It is therefore evident that a campaign
contribution is a 'thing of value' for bribery purposes, but the result is that the potential
sweep of the bribery statutes is enormous.").
169. See John Harwood, Clinton Pardon Firestorm Raises Questions About Nearly

Everyone Involved in Process, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2001, at A24 (Noting that questions
have been raised about connection between fundraising and pardon grants by the
President); James V. Grimaldi, Denise Rich Gave Clinton Library $450,000, WASH. POST,

Feb. 10, 2001, at El (Describing donations to Clinton presidential library by former wife of
fugitive financier Marc Rich who received a pardon).
170. See Cecilie Rohwedder, Kohl Agrees to Pay Fine to End CriminalInvestigation,
WALL ST. J. (EUROPE), Feb. 9, 2001 at 1 (Former Chancellor Kohl agreed to pay a fine

of C153,390 to settle a criminal investigation "in the biggest political scandal in German's
postwar history" involving a secret campaign contribution fund).
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donations are not diverted to personal use but instead finance a political campaign,
a contribution given to purchase an elected official's support or vote on
legislation is equally corrupt. As the Supreme Court noted, "Elected officials are
of financial
influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect
17
gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns." '
The United States sought to limit some of the pernicious effects of
campaign contributions by requiring disclosure of donors and imposing
limitations on the total amount that individuals may contribute directly to a
candidate. 172 The rationale for such restrictions was that transparency has a
curative effect on the process of raising money, and contribution limits diminish
the possibility of corruption. The system of campaign contribution regulation in
the United States is complex, however, and riddled with loopholes.173 The most
problematic aspect is the failure to regulate what are known as "soft money"
contributions to third-party organizations and the political parties that use the
funds to support a candidate or position. The Supreme Court struck down
spending limitations imposed on organizations that were not directly under the
candidate's control. 174 Significant amounts of money have been funneled through
171. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
497 (1985). Professor Strauss argues that payments to elected officials are only corrupt
when the official uses the money for personal gain, not when the funds are employed in
support of an election campaign. See David A. Strauss, ihat is the Goal of Campaign
Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 144 ("the central distinction between
campaign contributions and bribes-that the former, unlike the latter, do not (in principle)
enrich the candidate-may indeed be decisive.); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equalioy
and Campaign FinanceReform, 94 COLUMI. L. REV. 1369, 1373 (1994) (same). Professor
Lowenstein disagrees, arguing that "[t]he law, the simplest and most unmistakable elements
of our political culture, and, for most of us, our sense of what is right and wrong in politics,
all tell us that acceptance of a campaign contribution in exchange for official decisions
favorable to the contributor is a corrupt practice." Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign
Contributionsand Corruption: Comments on Strauss and Cain, 1995 U. CHI. L.F. 163,
173; see also Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruptionin CampaignFinanceLaw, 14
CONST. Q. 127, 131 (1997) ("it is corrupt for an officeholder to take money in exchange
for some action. The money may be a bribe for personal use or a campaign contribution.").
172. 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (2000).
173. At the federal level, the campaign finance laws are administered and enforced by
the Federal Election Commission. Any person making aggregate contributions of more
than $200 to a candidate must be disclosed, including the date and amount of the
contributions, Id., and cannot contribute more than S1,000 per election to an individual
candidate, $5,000 annually to a political committee, and no more than S25,000 total per
year for all types of campaign contributions. 2 U.S.C § 441a(a) (2000). There are complex
administrative regulations defining, among other things, "earmarked" contributions and
contribution "conduits" that may be used to avoid the contribution limits. I1 C.F.R. §
110.6 (2000).
174. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republic Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct.
2351, 2358 (2001) (Noting that the Court has distinguished regulations on campaign
contributions and expenditures because "a reason for the distinction is that limits on
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organizations that are clearly designed to support a particular candidate, yet there
is little regulation of the use of the funds and no limit on contributions. Recent
calls for campaign finance reform in the United States focus on the problem of
soft money donations and the potentially corrupting effect they have on elections
for national office. Aside from administrative regulations, there have been
occasional criminal prosecutions in the United States related to campaign
contributions. The cases generally involve violations related to false statements in
disclosure documents required by the campaign reporting provisions, usually with
no accusation 75that the candidate engaged in a corrupt arrangement in exchange for
the donation.
Many contributors expect a candidate to support certain positions, and
may express their sentiment in favor of those positions by making a donation. Not
every contribution is specifically linked to a particular issue, and "[a] contribution
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does
not communicate the underlying basis for the support."'176 There is an expectation
that the candidate will maintain previously announced stands on the issues and can
expect future contributions for supporting particular positions. The mutuality of
expectation between contributors and candidates is not necessarily corrupt,
although there is no doubt that each side understands the relationship of the
donation to the exercise of authority, that it is "for or because of' certain future
decisions. Campaign contributions may purchase access to an official at some
future point when an issue of importance to the donor arises. 177 Similarly,
contributions are more clearly justified by a link to political corruption than limits on other
kinds of unlimited political spending are (corruption being understood not only as quidpro
quo agreements, but also an undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the
appearance of such influence .... "); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Pol.
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) ("[T]he absence of prearrangement and
coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate and thereby
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.").
175. See, e.g., United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (charges for filing
false statements with the Federal Election Commission [FEC] related to contributions to the
Democratic Party through "straw contributors" that did not disclose the identity of the true
donors); United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 1998) (charges for filing false
statements with the FEC by using straw donors to conceal the identity of foreign
contributors to the Democratic Party).
176. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam).
177. See Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor
Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 840
(1998) ("[T]he suspicion that 'access' leads to corruption persists."); David Adamany,
PAC's and the Democratic Financingof Politics, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 569, 571-72 (1980)
("Contributors may give because they like a candidate or his positions, for reasons of
personal friendship, from a sense of civic duty, to support the two-party system, or even to
facilitate nonpolitical relationships with friends or business associates. But many
contributors intend to purchase access-the opportunity to plead a case with public
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legislators in leadership positions or who head important committees often receive
large campaign contributions-even though many have little need for the money
because they face no real opposition in elections-through "rent extraction" by
gathering funds from donors with an interest in legislation before the body or their
committee. 178 The motive for donating to a candidate who does not need the
contribution is clearly one of gaining access or protecting a position, and powerful
legislators can extract the contributions on the perceived threat that failure to pay
will result in the denial of entree to the decision-making process or at least a less
sympathetic hearing on an issue.
1. The Ouid Pro Ouo Requirement

The difficult issue for the criminal law is the relationship of an anticorruption statute to campaign contributions. Voters expect candidates to state
their positions publicly, and legislators are all-too-happy to proclaim their support
or opposition to those sympathetic with their position. If a contributor voices to
the candidate that the contribution is designed to persuade the official to take or
maintain a particular position upon election to office, then that statement
apparently shows the donor provided the funds with the intent to "influence"-or
"for or because of"---an official action; acceptance of the contribution with
knowledge of the donor's intent may establish that the candidate acted corruptly.
Although the transaction could meet the technical requirements for a bribe or
illegal gratuity under Section 201, no one suggests that all donors who support a
position through a donation and all candidates for federal office who seek
donations by asserting a position are guilty of a criminal violation. The potential
breadth of anti-corruption statutes presents a special problem in dealing with
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of
campaign contributions.
reconciling the prohibition on bribery with the system of campaign contributions
in two cases that reflect the difficulties in applying federal anti-corruption law to
an area in which it is permissible to solicit and donate money in order to influence
Section 201, the principle federal statute targeting bribery,
a position. 179
reaches only misconduct by federal officers and employees, not state or local
government officials. 80 Corruption at these lower levels is probably greater than
officials.").
178. Ayers & Bulow, supra note 177, at 846 ("Politicians engage in 'rent extraction'
when they threaten potential donors with unfavorable treatment unless a sufficiently large
contribution is made. Rent extraction almost surely explains some of the anomalous
patterns of giving-particularly, the 'everybody loves a winner' phenomenon. The high
level of contributions made to incumbents with safe seats is consistent with rent extraction
because incumbents have the greatest ability to extort donations.").
179. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991); see also Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
180. See 1 SARAH WELLING ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED
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at the federal level because there are more officials in local and state governments
than in the federal government and their authority touches virtually every business
and individual, from police protection to garbage collection to zoning laws. The
federal effort to prosecute corruption at lower levels has come through a statute-

the Hobbs Act' 8

-

that specifically prohibits extortion, not bribery. Beginning in

the early 1970s, federal prosecutors sought to expand the reach of the Hobbs Act
to encompass corruption in state and local government. 8 2 The endeavor has been
largely successful as courts made the Hobbs Act a principle anti-corruption
provision to punish the receipt of bribes--passive corruption-by a wide variety
of state and local officials. 83 The expansion of the Hobbs Act into an anticorruption statute forced the Supreme Court to confront the question of how
broadly to apply the provision to campaign contributions. The Court's analysis is
instructive on the difficulties in applying the criminal law to donations to elected
officials.
Congress adopted the Hobbs Act as a successor to an earlier law, the
Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934,184 which was designed to combat extortion and
violence perpetrated by criminal organizations against private individuals.' Like
the Anti-Racketeering Act, the Hobbs Act prohibits robbery and extortion to

obtain property, and it defines two types of extortion: physical coercion
("wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear") and the use of
public office ("under color of official right"). 186 The meaning of this second type
ACTIONS § 15.15 at 591-92 (1998) ("Federal prosecutors employ the color-of-official-right

prong of the Hobbs Act to prosecute state and local officials for bribery and corruption
because the federal bribery and gratuities statutes only apply to federal officials and
employees.").
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
182. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 266 n.5 (1991).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 1951, n.9, 41 (2000).
184. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (superseded by the Hobbs Act in
1946).
185. Congress enacted the Hobbs Act in response to the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942), which held that the Anti.
Racketeering Act did not apply to extortion committed by unionized truckers who
demanded payments from out-of-town drivers before permitting them to enter the state. Id.
at 530; see Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecutionof Local Corruption:A Case Study in
the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1174-75 (1977) (discussing

history of Hobbs Act).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000). The statute provides:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property in furtherance
of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this
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of extortion--"under color of official right"--was unclear because the common
law development of bribery and extortion did not distinguish clearly between the
two crimes. 187 Federal prosecutors first applied the Hobbs Act successfully to
reach corruption by local officials in 1972 in a prosecution of the political "boss"
of a county in New Jersey who required that a percentage of all government
contracts be paid to him for the privilege of doing business with local
governments.1 8 Although there was no overt threat to those who paid off the
local boss, the court of appeals upheld the conviction because the simple fact
of
9
public office established that those who paid were victims of the extortion.IS
Broadly interpreted, the Hobbs Act became a powerful tool for federal
prosecutors intent on combating corruption at the local level. There was no need
to establish that the official in any way threatened the payer of the money, or
indeed that there was any overt discussion of the reason for the payment. Courts
found the "under color of official right" element satisfied upon proof that the
official had the authority to affect the outcome of an exercise of governmental
authority. This type of extortion is effectively a form of bribery, and courts
recognized explicitly that a public official charged with violating the Hobbs Act
was in reality alleged to have taken a bribe. 90 The weakness of the Hobbs Act
was that the statute only prohibits extortion, and not specifically bribery, which
means that it reaches the official extorting the property but not the person paying
it. Unlike Section 201(b), which covers both the offeror and the recipient, only
passive corruption comes within the prohibition of the Hobbs Act This created
the anomalous situation that a person giving a bribe to a federal official could be
charged with a violation of Section 201, but another person making the same
payment to a state or local official would be the "victim"
of extortion and not
9
subject to criminal prosecution under the Hobbs Act.' '
section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both.
Id. § 1951(a).
187. See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion:
From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 834 (1988) ("The text of
the Hobbs Act is not clear, and those who pretend that it is are merely maling the analysis
of its meaning more difficult.").
188. United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1210 (3d Cir. 1972); see Ruff, supranote
185, at 1177.
189. Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229. The defendants argued that the government had to
prove that they used force or the threat to obtain the money, but the court held that
extortion could be proved by either evidence of a threat or that the defendants' obtained the
money because of their position of official authority.
190. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 266 (1992) (defendant's acceptance of
a "bribe" met the requirements for conviction for extortion under color of official right); 1
WELLING ET AL., supra note 180, § 15.15 at 591 ("[V]irtually all modem 'color ofofficial
right' prosecutions have alleged bribery or similar forms of corrupt conduct.").
191. See United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1383 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[A] private
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The interpretation of extortion under color of official right as a form of
bribery triggered the issue of what constitutes a violation when the payment
appears to be a campaign contribution. The Supreme Court first considered the
problem in McCormick v. United States.192 The defendant, a state legislator, had
sponsored legislation permitting doctors who received a medical degree from a
foreign school to practice medicine with a state-issued temporary permit while
studying for a permanent license. 93 During a reelection campaign, McCormick
contacted the lobbyist for the doctors and said that "his campaign was expensive,
that he had paid considerable sums out of his own pocket, and that he had not
heard anything from the foreign doctors."'' 94 The lobbyist gave McCormick five
cash gifts on the doctors' behalf, and the defendant did not list any of the
payments on his campaign disclosure forms as required by state law. 95 The
defendant argued that the payments were campaign
contributions and therefore
9
were not extorted under color of official right.'
The Court began its analysis by noting the central role donations play in
the American electoral system and the problem with a broad criminal prohibition
on extortion under color of official right:
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will
benefit the district and individuals and groups therein is the
everyday business of a legislator. It is also true that
campaigns must be run and financed. Money is constantly
being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run on platforms
and who claim support on the basis of their views and what
they intend to do or have done.
Whatever ethical
considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold that
legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act
for the benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering
the interests of some of their constituents, shortly before or
after campaign contributions are solicited and received from
those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what
Congress could have meant by making it a crime to obtain

person cannot be convicted of extortion under color of official right."); United States v.
McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1991) (government cannot charge a private person
with extortion under color of official right).
192. 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
193. Id. at 259.
194. Id. at 260.
195. Id. The state prohibited cash contributions in excess of $50, W. VA. CODE § 3-85d (1990), and the doctors' organizations did not list the payments as campaign
contributions in its record of expenditures.
196. Id. at 268.
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property from197another, with his consent, "under color of
official right."
The Court held that a Hobbs Act violation involving the payment of funds that are
ostensibly campaign contributions requires proof that "the payments were made in
return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to
perform an official act."198 The Court noted that this was a special case because
the defendant was an elected official, and that "if the payments to McCormick
proof of a quid pro quo would be essential for an
were campaign contributions,
99
extortion conviction."'
McCormick's imposition of a quidpro quo element under the Hobbs Act
is consistent with the requirements for proving a bribe. If extortion under color of
official right is a form of bribery-it has the same structure as a bribe because the
official conditions future action on the receipt of a payment-then the Court's
imposition of a quidpro quo requirement is proper, even though the statute itself
makes no reference to bribery or the elements of that crime. The Court sowed
confusion, however, by noting that it was only deciding a campaign contribution
case and not whether the quidpro quo element applied "in other contexts, such as
elected official receives gifts, meals, travel expenses, or other items of
when an
,200
value.
The similarity between the Hobbs Act's extortion under color of official
right provision and the bribery statute was illuminated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Evans v. United States,20 1 decided a year after McCormick. The
defendant was an elected local official who took $8,000 from an undercover agent
who purported to seek assistance to rezone a tract of land, an issue that would
come before the defendant for a vote. 202 Evans asserted that the funds were
campaign contributions, and $1,000 of the proceeds was in the form of a check
payable to his campaign committee. 0 3 The Court rejected the argument that the
Hobbs Act requires that an official make an affirmative inducement to qualify as
extortion under color of official right.204 In analyzing the statute, the Court
viewed the wrongdoing as bribery, stating that "the wrongful acceptance of a
bribe establishes all the inducement that the statute requires."20 5 The Court's
analysis in Evans makes it clear that the Hobbs Act parallels the crime of bribery
by requiring proof that the parties reach an agreement, although that agreement
need be neither express nor fulfilled for criminal liability.
197. Id. at 272.
198. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272 (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 274 n.10.
201.504 U.S. 255 (1992).
202. Id. at 257.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 265-66
205. Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
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For a Hobbs Act prosecution for public corruption, the question is what
level of proof the government must introduce to establish the quid pro quo
element when the payment may be a campaign contribution. In McCormick, the
Court stated that the illegal exchange must involve "an explicit promise or
undertaking" by the elected official to take action.206 If by "explicit" the Court
meant "express," then it imposed a significant, and perhaps insurmountable,
evidentiary burden on the prosecutor. The dissenting opinion in the case pointed
out that "[s]ubtle extortion is just as wrongful-and probably much more
common-than the kind of express understanding that the Court's opinion seems
to require. '' 207 In Evans, the Court found that the government met the quid pro
quo requirement set forth in McCormickbecause there was proof that the payment
was in exchange for the defendant's agreement to perform an official act, and
"fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense." 208 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy asserted that "[t]he official and the payer
need not state the quid pro quo in express terms,
20 9 for otherwise the law's effect
could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods."
Taken together, McCormick and Evans show that the Court incorporated
the core element of bribery-the quid pro quo-as the key for corruption
prosecutions of elected officials without going into detail whether bribery and
extortion under color of official right were coterminous. The possibility that
payments might be campaign contributions necessitated a limited application of
the Hobbs Act, leading the Court to import the quidpro quo element from bribery
to extortion prosecutions involving public officials. McCormick's requirement
that the official make "an explicit promise or undertaking" largely reiterates the
quidpro quo element of a bribery prohibition, that there be an exchange in which
each party understands that the payment is designed to influence a particular
decision. Evans did not create a different standard but only emphasized that
bribery does not require consummation
of the exchange or proof that the parties
210
entered into a binding agreement.
206. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 273.
207. Evans, 504 U.S. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 268. (The Court stated, "We hold today that the Government need only
show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he is not entitled, knowing that
the payment was made in return for official acts.").
209. Id. at 274 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
210. See United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 372 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Court wrote
broadly enough to require proof of a quid pro quo in all cases charging extortion under
color of official right."); United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 696 (6th Cir. 1994)
("Evans provided a gloss on the McCormick Court's use of the word 'explicit' to qualify its
quid pro quo requirement."). The lower courts have not been unanimous in reading
McCormick and Evans together, with some regarding Evans as governing cases in which
there is no campaign contribution while viewing McCormick as imposing a higher standard
in campaign contribution cases. See United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 553 (11th Cir.
1994); United States v. Taylor, 993 F.2d 382, 385 (4th Cir. 1993). Although the Hobbs Act
does not specifically proscribe bribery, the Court's decisions in McCormick and Evans
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2. The Uneasy Coexistence of Anti-Corruption Law and Campaign
Contributions
The Supreme Court's statement in McCormick that the government must
prove an "explicit' agreement when the payment may be a campaign contribution
does not appear to mean that the parties to the transfer have an express agreement,
akin to a contract. Instead, the Court sent a signal that cases involving campaign
contributions require special care, involving unequivocal corroboration of the
corrupt nature of the exchange. Without unmistakable proof of an agreement, the
criminal law impinges on the campaign finance system and creates serious doubt
about the legality of contributions for candidates and contributors. The Court in
McCormick was reluctant to extend a statute that, by its terms, did not expressly
reach bribery of public officials to encompass "not only conduct that has long
been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is
unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private contributions
or expenditures, as they have been from the beginning of the Nation."2'1 The
decision did not impose a greater evidentiary burden than the quid pro quo
requirement of a bribery statute, but the thrust of the analysis made it clear that
prosecutors and judges must tread carefully when the payments may be campaign
contributions. The Court's reticence about extending the Hobbs Act should be
equally applicable to a pure bribery prohibition, such as Section 201(b).
Donations are an important, even crucial, part of the election system in
countries that rely on private funding of campaigns. The signal in McCormick to
tread carefully reflects the concern that the inevitable clash of an anti-corruption
statute with a core facet of the democratic system implicates significant
constitutional issues. The Court took a similarly cautious approach to campaign
finance legislation, finding that the likelihood that contributions vill be corrupt, or
appear corrupt, permitted legislatures to impose restrictions on contributions to
candidates that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment's right to
political expression.2 12 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court stated that "[t]o the extent
that large contributions are given to secure political quid pro quos from current
and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined." 213 The Court upheld limits on the amount individuals
can contribute to campaigns, despite the First Amendment, on the ground that
Congress could rightly conclude that in addition to bribery laws the "contribution
ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or
incorporate bribery into extortion, so it is logical that the quidpro quo element, which is
the key to proving bribery, would be the primary issue. The cases do not have different
quid pro quo elements, but rather the Court emphasized that campaign contributions
present a qualitatively different problem that requires a greater showing to demonstrate that
the payment was not an acceptable donation but an illegal exchange.
211. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272.

212. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
213. Id. at 26.
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appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited campaign
contributions ....,,2214
Yet, the Court also invalidated certain limitations on
campaign expenditures to support a candidate made by organizations operating
independently of the campaign because there did not appear to be as great a
possibility of corruption as with direct contributions. 215 Subsequent decisions
reiterate the focus on corruption as the key to balancing the permissibility of
limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures with First Amendment
rights.216
214. Id. at 28.
215. Id. at 46. The Court stated,
Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well
provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may
prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not
only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but
also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.
Id. at 47. The Court found that the government did not have a sufficiently strong interest in
regulating the expenditures to overcome the First Amendment right to free speech of those
subject to the limitation. The Court held that donating money to political campaigns is a
form of speech protected by the First Amendment, id. at 14-15, so that any infringement on
the constitutional right must be based on a significant governmental interest. The need to
prohibit corruption was sufficient to uphold the contribution limits, but the lesser
possibility of corruption for independent expenditures meant that the restriction was
unconstitutional. The Court's acceptance of the possibility of corruption from campaign
contributions has been criticized as unsupportable, Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks:
Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 63 (1997)

("Money's alleged corrupting effects are far from proven ....
The anticorruption rationale
fails to justify additional regulation of campaign speech and contributions.").
216. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S.
604, 616 (1996) (independent expenditures by state political party cannot be restricted
because the Court was "not aware of any special dangers of corruption associated with
political parties that tip the constitutional balance in a different direction."); Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (upholding state restriction on
expenditures of corporate funds on behalf of candidates because the regulation "aims at a
different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form
and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political
ideas."); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259 (1986)
(enforcement action against non-profit advocacy organization for violating federal
limitation on expenditures by corporations was unconstitutional because such organizations
"do not pose that danger of corruption."); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985) (independent expenditures by political action
committee is unconstitutional because "the effort to link either corruption or the appearance
of corruption to independent expenditures by PACs, whether large or small, simply does
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The Court's reliance on corruption as the foundation for permissible
campaign finance regulation is based on its generalized belief about the political
system, that large cash contributions may lead to quidpro quo arrangements that
are unlikely to be exposed, thereby allowing prophylactic rules to limit
contributions because of the appearance of corruption. The most serious form of
corruption is bribery, and the Court adopted the language of that prohibition by
focusing on the possibility of a quidproquo between donor and candidate as the
core form of misconduct justifying limited restrictions on political donations. 37
Nevertheless, the Court accepted the fact that contributions can buy influence with
an elected official because political discourse-and the money necessary to
publicize a position-is fundamental to democracy. The possibility that a donor
might gain access to a candidate alone is insufficiently corrupt to override the
importance of people's rights to make campaign contributions as an expression of
their position.
The notion of corruption advanced in the campaign finance area is quite
similar to the message in McCormick, an approach that is more a pragmatic
accommodation of campaign contributions than a principled analysis of what is
and is not corrupt.218 For criminal prosecutions involving payments that are even
arguably campaign contributions, the government must establish the quidpro quo
so clearly that there is no possible doubt that the transaction was corrupt. Yet,
unlike the explicit focus on corruption as the guiding principle in the campaign
finance regulation cases, the Court took only an indirect approach in McCormick
and Evans to describe the requirements for criminal liability. After those
decisions, it is difficult to explain precisely what must be proven for a bribery
prosecution of an elected official when the payment may be a campaign
contribution. The Hobbs Act does not even mention bribery, therefore it is not
surprising that the leading cases on what constitutes a violation are unclear on
exactly how campaign contributions should be accommodated to the criminal
prohibition. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the role of the Hobbs
Act as an anti-corruption statute, its analysis reflects the broader struggle to
reconcile the needs of the election system with an anti-corruption regime.
Much like United States law, international efforts to combat corruption
do not expressly deal with campaign contributions, despite the importance of the
subject for nations that rely on private financing of political campaigns. While a
bribe may be disguised as a campaign contribution, democracies whose election
not pass this standard of reviev.").
217. See Brovn, supra note 154, at 803. "The corruption that bothered the Court [in
Buckley v. Valeo] was quid pro quo corruption. It is true that the opinion depicted

campaign contributions as less 'blatant' than bribery, but the very use of the term quid pro

quo reinforces the similarity" between corruption and bribery. Id.
218. James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion
Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1695, 1709 (1993). "As to McCormick's explicit quid pro

quo requirement where campaign contributions are involved, Justice White's argument is
" Id.
neither textual nor historical. Rather, it's a pragmatic and logical argument ....
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systems depend on private, voluntary donations to finance campaigns cannot
prohibit or even unduly restrict such payments. Campaign finance can be subject
primarily to administrative regulation, as in the United States, but even there the
criminal prohibition remains as an important means to deter and police abuses of
the system. Where anti-corruption law fails, in both the United States and in the
International Conventions, it is the absence of any acknowledgment of the need to
find a balance between the criminal law and acceptable campaign finance
practices that permit donors to purchase access to and influence with a candidate.
Campaign contributions are, by their nature, given to influence or reward
the candidate. The Supreme Court's hesitancy in applying the Hobbs Act to
purported campaign contributions without proof of an "explicit" agreement
indicates that, at a minimum, the criminal law should only be applied when there
is strong proof of a bribe and not just a gratuity. It may be that the criminal law
cannot-or should not-reach campaign contributions that effectively buy access
to an elected official because that is the price for having elections financed by
voluntary contributions. In other words, while quid pro quo arrangements should
be prosecuted, the criminal law is not equipped to ensure equality among donors
or the overall fairness of the campaign finance system. Although wealth may give
a certain class of donors greater access to officials, that fact alone does not make a
contribution corrupt unless the law clearly limits the amount or source of
donations. Those types of prohibitions, however, are ill-suited to a broad criminal
provision that cannot be written to distinguish liability based on the size or source
of contributions. Instead, more detailed campaign contribution limitations should
be embodied in a system designed by the legislature to regulate administratively
the methods of financing political campaigns.
Unlike more common examples of bribery, the quid pro quo involving
campaign contributions need not personally enrich the official because the
subversion of the political process is the harm from the exchange. Corruption in
the context of campaign contributions is qualitatively different from payments to
non-elected officials because the cost to the system is not the official's personal
gain-beyond election or retention of office-but the perversion of the
representative's responsibility to advance the common good. Absent substantial
changes in the campaign finance system, a broad anti-corruption law should only
reach those instances of a clear quidpro quo arrangement involving a trade of the
elected official's vote or support for the donation.
One facet of campaign finance regulation should include some
demarcation between criminal acts and administrative violations.
The
accommodation of the political reality of campaign contributions with an anticorruption law should be explicit and not left to guesswork about whether a
criminal provision applies to a purported donation. Although elected officials
should not be permitted to label every payment a campaign contribution, and
thereby exempt themselves from criminal prosecution, broadly written bribery and
gratuity provisions that do not incorporate some consideration of political
donations create uncertainty about an important facet of the political system. It is
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a delicate balance, but at a minimum anti-corruption law should require clear
proof of a quidpro quo and not simply that a donation was given to provide the
donor access to the official.

C. Fraud as an Anti-Corruption Device
Bribery is the core form of corruption, but a quidpro quo exchange is not
the sole method by which officials misuse public authority. The types of
corruption reviewed to this point largely involve a two-party exchange, whether it
is bribery or illegal gratuities. The Hobbs Act model of extortion as a form of
bribery involves the same structure because there are two parties to the
transaction, although only the public official acting under color of official right is
liable for criminal prosecution and the payer is the victim. Yet, corruption is
never as simple, or necessarily as brazen, as the offer and receipt of a payment in
exchange for official action. Public authority can be misused in a variety of ways,
and limiting an anti-corruption regime to just bribery and similar exchanges would
miss a broad array of conduct that results in personal enrichment through the
exercise of that authority. In the United States, the method of choice for attacking
public corruption in a wide array of situations-including bribery and gratuitiesis the Mail Fraud statute,219 a provision celebrated 20
and assailed as one of the most
malleable provisions in all of federal criminal law.
The Mail Fraud statute was first adopted in 1872 to prevent individuals
from using the post office to perpetrate frauds on unsuspecting victims.21 The
219. 18 U.S.C § 1341 (2000). A companion provision, the Wire Fraud statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (2000), applies the same analysis to fraudulent schemes involving the use of
interstate wire, radio, or television transmissions. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S.
19, 25 n.6 (1987).
220. See Alex Hortis, Note, Valuing Honest Senices: The Common Law Evolution of
Section 1346, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1099, 1113-14 (1999) ("ITihe aspect of the mail fraud
statute that has received the most criticism, its broad malleability, has also been cited as its
greatest value.").
New Zealand has a statute that is strikingly similar to the mail fraud statute, imposing
liability on any person acting with "intent to defraud" who uses "any document that is
capable of being used to obtain any privilege, benefit, pecuniary advantage, or valuable
consideration. . . ." Crimes Act 1961 § 229A(b) (N.Z.). The requirement that a document
be used has been described as "colourless," much like the mailing element of the Mail
Fraud statute, and the provision has been extended "into an uncharacteristically broad crime
of fraud." James Mullineux, A Comprehensive Crime of Fraud,10 CRIM. L.F. 281,283-84
(1999).
221. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323; see Peter J. Henning,
Maybe It Should Just Be Called FederalFraud: The ChangingNature of the Mail Fraud
Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 442 (1995) ("The language of the original mail fraud statute,
however, appears designed to protect the post office from being abused as part of a
fraudulent scheme."). The sponsor of the legislation in the House of Representatives stated
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statute prohibits "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises"
by which the defendant uses the post office or an commercial delivery service as a
means to execute the fraudulent scheme. 2 There is no definition in the statute of
what constitutes a "scheme or artifice to defraud," although fraud is a form of
larceny, a common law crime requiring proof that the defendant took possession
of property with an intent to steal.22 Unlike common thefts in which the
defendant takes property from the victim, fraud involves a deceit that causes the
victim to part with the property voluntarily. 224 The Mail Fraud statute is broader
than the common law offenses involving deception-larceny by trick,
embezzlement, and false pretenses- because the statute reaches any scheme to
defraud, not just false statements of past or present facts that result in a loss. 22' As
that the law was targeted at "thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purposes of
deceiving and fleecing the innocent people of the country." CONG. GLOBE, 41 st Cong., 3rd
Sess. 35 (1870) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000):
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell,
dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or
furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin,
obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or
intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do,
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service,
or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to
be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or
takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the
direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered
by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall
be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30
years, or both.
223. See DRESSLER, supra note 58, § 32.02[A] at 546 ("Common law larceny is the
trespassory taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with the intent to
permanently deprive the possessor of the property.").
224. See Ellen S. Podgor, CriminalFraud,48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 737 (1999) ("The
'classic definition' of fraud in English law focuses on 'deceit' or 'secrecy.' In United
States federal criminal law the term is often synonymously used with the term 'deceit."').
225. Common law crimes involving fraud required proof of a misstatement or
omission regarding a past or present fact, and not a matter of opinion ("mere puffery") or a
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the Supreme Court stated, "[T]he words 'to defraud' commonly refer 'to wronging
one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,' and 'usually sign6
'
the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.
Yet, like any larceny, fraud involves a gain to the defendant and a loss to the
victim.
The Mail Fraud statute remained largely confined to con artists and other
types of chicaneryn 7 until the early 1970s. At approximately the same time that
the Hobbs Act became a tool for fighting corruption, federal prosecutors applied
the Mail Fraud statute to reach abuses of authority that went beyond the types of
confidence games and scams that were previously the target of prosecution.
The provision does not specifically mention corruption, but prosecutors argued
that a scheme to defraud includes misuse of authority-constituting a breach of
fiduciary duty-for personal gain. For public officials, the government asserted
that the failure to disclose misconduct deprived the citizenry of its right to honest
and faithfil service from those who exercise government authority. Unlike the
classic fraud in which a defendant's statements trick the victim out of money or
property, the fraud by a public official results in the loss of the intangible right to
the fair exercise of authority that violates the official's duty to put the public
interest before his own personal interest. 29
statement of future conduct, such as a promise to pay at a later date that is ultimately not
fulfilled. See DRESSLER, supra note 58, § 32.10LB] at 564-65.
226. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v.
United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)).
227. See, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989) (used car dealer who
rolled-back odometers on cars before selling to dealers); United States v. Sampson, 371
U.S. 75 (1962) (fraudulent advanced-fee loan scheme); Pereim v. United States, 347 U.S. 1
(1954) (victim tricked into marrying one of the defendants and providing funds to husband
and his partner for bogus investments).
228. See Henning, supra note 221, at 460-61 ("Beginning in the 1970s, federal
prosecutors began using the mail fraud statute to attack political corruption at the federal,
state, and local level."); Andrew T. Baxter, FederalDiscretionin the Prosecution ofLocal
PoliticalCorruption, 10 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1983) (reviewing history of federal
effort targeting corruption of state and local officials including direction from President
Ford to focus prosecutorial resources on local corruption).
229. See Henning, supra note 221, at 461 ("The deprivation was of an intangible right,
not a property right, and the scheme involved the official's breach of a fiduciary duty by
failing to disclose the corrupt activity."). One of the earliest prosecutions of a high
government official under the Mail Fraud statute was the case against former Maryland
Governor Marvin Mandel. In upholding the conviction, the Fourth Circuit stated that the
statute reaches "any scheme that is contrary to public policy [or] conflicts with accepted
standards of moral uprightness, fundamental honesty, fair play, and right dealing." United
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1360-61 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr,
Mail FraudMeets Criminal Theory, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1998) ("Public officials
who fail to provide honest services are said to defraud the citizens and the state of their
right to receive such services from those officials. The obligation to provide honest
services, and the intangible right to that service, depend on the existence of a special
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The intangible rights theory provided a means to reach misconduct by
public officials and even those who affected the exercise of government authority
but who did not hold any public office. In United States v. Margiotta,230 the
government successfully prosecuted the head of a local political party who
controlled the apportionment of government insurance contracts and received
kickbacks from agencies that received the contracts. The Second Circuit upheld
the conviction on the ground that the local government had the right to have its
affairs "conducted honestly, free from corruption, fraud and dishonesty" and that
the defendant owed a duty to act honestly even though he held no official
position. 23' This broader approach to what constitutes a fraudulent scheme
included those in the private sector who breached a fiduciary duty to act honestly
and not favor their own interests over those of an employer or client. In one case,
the government successfully prosecuted a state senator, not for conduct related to
his elected office, but because he failed to disclose to a client of his law firm that
he was working for232a competitor, a violation of his fiduciary obligation as a
lawyer to his client.
There was almost no limit on the application of the intangible rights
theory to prosecute misuse of authority or failure to disclose conflicts of interest,
until the Supreme Court rejected the theory in McNally v. United States.233 The
scheme in McNally involved a state officer and a powerful local party official who
directed the award of state insurance contracts to companies owned by their
friends and political allies, who returned a portion of the insurance premiums paid
by the state to the defendants. 3 The government charged the defendants under
the Mail Fraud statute for engaging in a scheme to defraud the citizens of the state
their right to honest services. 235 The government did not allege that the state lost
any money from the award of the contracts, and it did not appear that the state
paid any higher premiums for the insurance, or that the contracts were not
completely performed.236 The Court rejected the intangible rights theory, holding
relationship between the parties.").
230. 688 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1982).
231. 1d. at 114.
232. United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2nd Cir. 1981); see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 427, 434 (1998) (Decision in Bronston "crossed a critical threshold: before it, cases in
which there was only a conflict of interests, but neither a transaction between the fiduciary
and the client nor any misappropriation of information or property by the fiduciary from the
client, had been considered merely 'constructive fraud,' which did not amount to the type
of 'actual fraud' that transgressed the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.").
233.483 U.S. 350 (1987).
234. Id. at 352-55.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 360-61; see Hortis, supra note 220, at 1100 ("The state's losses as a result
of the scheme [in McNally] were unclear: The legislature had already set aside a
predetermined amount for insurance, the premiums charged were no higher than those of
other insurance companies, and the insurance company provided full insurance coverage to
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that the Mail Fraud statute requires proof that the defendant's scheme involved a
deprivation of money or property. 7 In reaching that conclusion, the Court stated
that "rather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries
ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure
and good government for local and state officials, we read [the
8 Mail Fraud statute]
as limited in scope to the protection of property rights .... ,,2
Congress quickly reversed the Court's rejection of the intangible rights
theory when it adopted Section 1346, which defines a scheme to defraud as
including "a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services." 239 Although the legislative history of this provision is sparse, it appears
that Congress intended to restore the intangible rights theory to the Mail Fraud
statute and permit prosecutions of government officials and private actors for
abuses of a position of authority.240 Section 1346 marked an important change in
the Mail Fraud statute by making explicit its application as an anti-corruption
measure.
The appeal of the statute, especially after the adoption of Section 1346, is
that the provision does not require the government to establish a quidpro quo or
other linkage between the misconduct and a payment. The Mail Fraud statute is
not limited to bribery or its structural equivalents, gratuities and extortion, so that
it covers a broader range of misconduct by public officials. The question is what
must the government prove to establish a scheme to defraud. As with any larceny,
common law fraud involves conduct-a deception or misrepresentation-that
causes a loss to the victim and a corresponding gain to the defendant. Section
1346 works a fundamental change on the crime of fraud in two ways. First, the
conduct element is an omission, i.e. the official's failure to disclose the corrupt
conduct that constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the public or one's
employer. 24' If an official has a personal interest in a decision or exercise of
governmental authority, he has a duty to disclose that interest and refrain from
participating in the process. Reaching a decision tainted by undisclosed selfinterest violates the official's duty to serve the public and constitutes the requisite
deception for a scheme to defraud. Second, by focusing on the right of honest
the state.").
237. McNally, 483 U.S. at 360-61
238. Id. at 360.
239. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
240. See 2 WELLING ET AL., supra note 180, § 17.19 at 34 ("[T]he lower courts have
agreed that in enacting § 1346 Congress overruled McNally and endorsed or reinstated the
pre-McNally cases that defined the concept of honest services."); see also Henning, supra
note 221, at 463 ("As with other amendments to the mail fraud statute, the legislative
history of this provision is sparse, although one sponsor stated that Congress intended to
restore the law to its pre-McNally state.").
241. See Moohr, supra note 229, at 19 ("Deception is found in the failure to disclose
the breach. It is fundamental to the offense that the actor owes and breaches fiduciary
duties of loyalty and honesty.").
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services as the object of the fraudulent scheme, Section 1346 means that the
defendant's gain from the misconduct need not correspond to the victim's loss,
and indeed there does not have to be any pecuniary or other tangible loss to
support a conviction for defrauding the public of its right to honest services.
Instead, the defendant's personal enrichment, traceable to the breach of fiduciary
duty, is enough for a violation.242
The crime is well-suited to public corruption prosecutions because all
officials have a fiduciary duty to put the interests of the public ahead of their own
personal advantage. Proof of a scheme involving deceit that results in a
substantial gain to the official is sufficient even without a corresponding loss
attributable to any particular victim. The factual situation leading to the
indictment in McNally provides a good example of the applicability of the Mail
Fraud statute to public corruption that might otherwise escape prosecution under a
bribery provision. The defendants awarded the insurance contracts to their friends
and political cronies, a fact not disclosed prior to the award. Further, they were
personally enriched by the payments from the insurers who received the contracts,
another fact not disclosed. Taken together, the defendants' conduct would
establish a scheme to defraud because the non-disclosure of control of the process
and personal benefit from the transaction would breach a fiduciary duty, thus
constituting a scheme to defraud. The absence of evidence that the state overpaid
for the insurance or did not receive full coverage is irrelevant to the mail fraud
analysis because the undisclosed misuse of office for personal gain establishes the
scheme to defraud; the defendant's gain from a scheme243need not correspond to the
victim's loss, unlike more traditional forms of larceny.
242. See United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 1998) ("No case we can
find in the long history of the intangible rights prosecutions holds that a breach of fiduciary
duty, without misuse of one's position for private gain, is an intangible rights fraud."); 2
WELLING ET AL., supra note 180, at § 17.19(a)(i) at 38 ("The enactment of § 1346
provides strong support for the view that it is the deprivation of the honest service by the
government official-regardless of any financial loss-that constitutes the fraud under
either the mail or wire fraud statute[s]."); see also Moohr, supra note 229, at 25 ("The
statutory harm is the loss of honest services, but the actor's gain is likely to be some
monetary award from a third party who was not deceived. Honest services fraud does not
require symmetry between the victim's loss and the actor's gain."); Hortis, supra note 220,
at 1108 ("The rise of the [intangible rights] theory can be attributed, in part, to a serious
evidentiary problem in public corruption cases where a specific harm was difficult to
ascertain.").
243. See Moohr, supra note 229, at 48 ("In these frauds, the defendant uses his or her
position to realize a goal of obtaining some benefit. Using the actor's ultimate objectiveto accept a bribe, to convert property to his or her own use, or exploit a conflict of
interest-focuses the inquiry on the defendant's purpose, whether that objective causes a
loss to the victim of the deceit or a gain or a benefit from a third party."); see also Coffee,
supra note 232, at 451 ("[T]he 'actual harm' standard [for Mail Fraud statute prosecutions]
works relatively poorly in the case of the public fiduciary .. .because we cannot
meaningfully measure 'harm' in this context (at least in the same concrete way that we can
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The scheme in McNally involved a clear abuse of public authority, but
prosecution under the bribery or extortion provisions may have been difficult.
The payments by the insurance companies were directed to another company
indirectly controlled by the defendants, and the government may not have had
proof of the quidpro quo arrangement that conditioned award of the contract to
the payment of a portion of the premiums. Under the Hobbs Act, the fact of
public office might have been sufficient to prove the extortion, but the absence of
evidence of the dealings between the defendants and the insurance companies
would have made it more difficult to establish that the payments were extorted
under color of official right However, the Mail Fraud statute, after the adoption
of Section 1346, shifts the focus away from the offeror of the payment and asks
whether the public official abused a position of trust leading to a personal profit
from the transactions. Proving a bribery quidproquo may be difficult, but a mail
fraud prosecution can rest on the official's misconduct that resulted in the
amassment of personal wealth.
By moving outside the two-party exchange paradigm of bribery, the Mail
Fraud statute addresses different types of corruption that involve the abuse of
official authority. Professor Kofele-Kale described a form of corruption called
"indigenous spoilation where there is only a taker, a corrupted individual but no
givers or corruptors." 244 He related a scenario in which the wife of a president of
a country demands large sums of money from the central bank to fund personal
shopping trips with no claim of right to the funds or intention to repay them; the
bank official provides the funds out of fear of losing a job. There is no overt
threat, or even direct pressure, sufficient to establish extortion, and the payment is
certainly not a bribe because there is no quidproquo. Yet, the wife is abusing the
president's authority for personal gain.
UnitedStates v. Rostenkowski245 presents a similar pattern of misconduct
found sufficient to charge a violation of the Mail Fraud statute. The defendant
was a powerful Congressman who had staff members engage in his personal
business, directed employees to secretly pay him a portion of their salary, and
took funds from his office postage account for personal use.246 None of the acts
involved bribery, but the Mail Fraud statute reached 2 this
47 conduct because the
Congressman abused public authority for personal gain.
in private economic transactions where there is a gain or loss), conflicts of interest and side
payments need to be disclosed or forbidden as a prophylactic matter.").
244. Kofele-Kale, supra note 15, at 158. He criticizes the anti-corruption conventions
because the quid pro quo "view of corruption as involving a bribe giver and bribe taker

may have symmetrical appeal but does not account for the entire range of corrupt
behavior." Id.
245.59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

246. Id. at 1294-96.
247. Id. at 1294-95. The government charged Congressman Rostenkowski with four

counts of mail fraud for the overall scheme, and individual charges of embezzlement and
false statements involving the specific forms of misconduct.
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The malleability of the provision has made it useful in a number of cases
involving the misuse of the office holder's stature to manipulate the exercise of
governmental authority. A public official who engages in influence-peddling by
offering his authority to intervene in other offices to benefit those willing to pay
breaches the duty to put the public interest before his own personal enrichment.
This situation is similar to influence buying by those who provide an official with
a gratuity, but the deception constitutes the criminal violation and not proof of a
quidpro quo arrangement. 248 A local government may become so corrupt that it
becomes common knowledge that anyone wishing to do business in the area or to
provide goods and services to the government must make payments to those who
control the reigns of power.249 Proof of bribery or extortion may be difficult if the
corruption is so pervasive that it is a routine matter, with no need for a demand or
an expression of what is expected in return for the payment. In that situation, the
Mail Fraud statute may be particularly effective at prosecuting the misconduct
because the focus is on the official's conduct in the exercise of authority and not a
particular transaction's mechanics.
There is no exact counterpart to the Mail Fraud statute in the
International Conventions, although Article VI(l)(c) of the IACAC contains a
similarly broad anti-corruption provision that covers much of the same
misconduct. Article VI(1)(c) prohibits an official "in the discharge of his duties"
from "illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or for a third party," and Article XI
prohibits personal gain through conduct involving a misuse of government
property and information for the official's own advantage. These provisions reach
beyond bribery to conduct that constitutes a breach of the right of honest services
resulting in personal enrichment. The IACAC's focus on the misuse of office is
similar to the breach of the fiduciary duty arising from the failure to disclose the
misconduct that is required for mail fraud. Each makes the official's improper
gain a requirement for finding criminal liability. Similar to federal law, the
IACAC scattered its anti-corruption provisions in different parts of the
248. See United States v. DeVegter, 198 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("When the
prosecution can prove the other elements of the wire fraud offense, taking kickbacks or
benefitting from an undisclosed conflict of interest will support the conviction of a public
official for depriving his or her constituents of the official's honest services because '[i]n a
democracy, citizens elect public officials to act for the common good. When official action
is corrupted by secret bribes or kickbacks, the essence of the political contract is violated."'
(quoting United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436,442 (8th Cir. 1996)).
249. See, e.g., United States v. Dischner, 960 F.2d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1991)
(defendants controlled award of all contracts for municipality in Alaska and received
kickbacks from "ten percent" companies known to pay defendants 10% of gross revenues;
"As one witness testified at trial, if you wanted to work on the North Slope [in Alaska],
'you had to pay Lew Dischner."').
250. See Hortis, supra note 220, at 1112-13 ("Distinguishing illicit corrupt activities
from noncorrupt legal activities can be extraordinarily difficult. Because corruption and
fraud in government elude easy definition, it is often more useful to examine government
officials' conduct on a case-by-case basis than to draft statutes to capture specific acts.").
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Convention and did not adopt a single approach to misuse of office that falls
outside the bribery paradigm. The Council Convention explicitly adopts only one
provision, on Trading in Influence, aimed at the misuse of office outside the
bribery context 7 5' Even that provision follows the bribery model by focusing on
the two-party arrangement where the official influences the affairs of another
office. The OECD Convention is the narrowest of the three, applying only to
bribery of foreign officials and not the more subtle forms of corruption. The
OECD's narrow goal seeks to minimize interference with domestic law outside
the context of international business transactions, so its exclusive focus on bribery
is designed to address the primary harm from corruption in that5 2area and not the
broader types of misconduct that can occur in a political system.

V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A UNIFIED CRIMTE OF CORRUPTION
The core form of corruption is bribery, and there is little dispute that the
elements of the offense require a quid pro quo arrangement for a particular
exercise of official authority. The criminal prohibition reaches both the offeror
("active corruption") and the recipient ("passive corruption"). The International
Conventions do not consider the role of gratuities and how influence buying fits in
under the bribery proscription. Unlike a bribe, a gratuity may be given after the
official decision, which means there would be no quid pro quo even though the
official received a personal benefit from the exercise of official authority.
Moreover, before the fact gifts designed to buy access to an official may be as
corrupting as an after the fact gift. After Sun Diamond, the law in the United
States has a gap that permits gifts to an official before a decision-unless they
constitute a bribe-but prohibits gifts given after a decision if the payment is "for
or because of'the official act. Gratuities present a difficult problem for criminal
prohibitions because gifts come in all sizes and may be given for a variety of
reasons, not all of which are corrupt or suspect. Yet, buying access to officials
responsible for creating and implementing policy is certainly questionable, and
often may be corrupt. The development of an international approach to corruption
should consider explicitly the question of whether and how to prohibit gratuities.
Additionally, the International Conventions do not address campaign
finance issues, and the criminal law application to donations to candidates for
elective office. A campaign contribution by its nature is designed to influence or
reward the recipient and contributors often expect that they will receive a hearing
251. The Council of Europe adopted the Convention on the Protection of the European
Communities' Financial Interests on July 26, 1995, that required the member states to adopt
legislation targeting fraudulent conduct involving funds of the European Union. The
Council adopted a protocol expanding the Convention to cover corruption on September
27, 1996, which served as the model for the Council Convention adopted in 1999. The
Council Convention did not include the fraud provisions of the earlier Convention.
252. See supra,text at note 9 1.
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from the official, and that the official will consider their interests in reaching a
decision. At the same time, the campaign finance system can provide an effective
cover for bribes and other illicit transactions. Simply labeling a payment as a
campaign contribution should not confer a form of immunity on the payer or the
recipient. Nations should consider the role of campaign contributions in defining
the outer limits of anti-corruption law. The United States has taken an indirect
approach to the issue, with the Supreme Court signaling to prosecutors that they
should act cautiously when considering the application of the criminal law to
payments that are at least arguably campaign contributions. 253 The Court did not
find campaign contributions completely outside the criminal prohibition on
bribery, but required that proof of corruption be clear from the
circumstances.25 4As nations modify their domestic law, they should review the
issue of campaign finance regulation and the role of the criminal law in order to
understand the relationship between the rights of citizens to donate money to their
chosen candidate and the need to prosecute corruption.
Once one looks beyond the core crime of bribery in the International
Conventions, the approaches to corruption diverge. The IACAC takes an
aggressive position that reaches a wide variety of conduct involving the misuse of
office for personal gain. The United States seems to have missed the import of the
language of Article VI(l)(c) by viewing it as a type of attempt crime and not a
separate form of corruption. The Mail Fraud statute covers much of the same
misconduct as Article VI(l)(c). Its focus on the official's personal gain through
the exercise of authority is an important expansion in the definition of corruption
beyond the bribery paradigm. The Council Convention identifies only one
specific crime-Trading in Influence-that would not constitute bribery, and even
there the definition is not entirely clear. The OECD Convention focuses
exclusively on criminalizing bribery by domestic entities involved in business
transactions outside the country, a potentially revolutionary step in addressing
corruption across national borders. Unlike the Council Convention and IACAC,
the OECD Convention does not seek to attack corruption across the board but
only in a narrower range of economic arrangements.
United States law has developed haphazardly in addressing corruption,
but through the Mail Fraud statute, particularly Section 1346, it reaches most
forms of misconduct by public officials resulting in personal enrichment. The
right of honest services provision focuses on identifying a breach of the official's
duty that constitutes a deception, and the personal benefit gained from the breach.
The Mail Fraud statute provides an effective tool for prosecuting public corruption
because it builds on the public's right to have official authority exercised properly,
and any failure to put the public's interest ahead of the official's own interest may
result in criminal liability if the official receives a personal benefit. Unlike the
two-party transaction in bribery, the Mail Fraud statute reaches the myriad of
253. See McCormick v. U.S., 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
254. Id. at 275-76.
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ways that government authority can be used to personally enrich individuals. The
international campaign should encompass added forms of corruption that are as
harmful as a bribe but do not fit within the two-party paradigm of the quidpro quo
exchange involving the offer and acceptance of a benefit. Betrayal of the public
trust is not limited to just bribes, but moves through the concentric circles of
gratuities, influence peddling, kickbacks, and misuse of authority for personal
enrichment that undermines the authority of governments.

